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UNITED
NATIONS
A
    General Assembly
A/648
16 September 1948
UNITED NATIONS



PROGRESS REPORT
OF THE
UNITED NATIONS MEDIATOR
ON PALESTINE
SUBMITTED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
FOR TRANSMISSION TO THE MEMBERS OF
THE UNITED NATIONS


In pursuance of paragraph 2, part II, of resolution 186 (S-2) of the
General Assembly of 14 May 1948






GENERAL ASSEMBLY
OFFICIAL RECORDS : THIRD SESSION
SUPPLEMENT No. 11 (A/648)



PARIS, 1948



TABLE OF CONTENTS

PART ONE

THE MEDIATION EFFORT
Page
I.
Introduction
3
II.
The basic factors in the Palestine situation
5
III.
Résumé of the negotiations
7
IV.
Demilitarization of Jerusalem
11
V.
Refugees
13
VI.
The resolution of the General Assembly of
29 November 1947
15
VII.
Protection of the Holy Places; common services
16
VIII.
Conclusions
17
Annexes
I.
Correspondence exchanged between the parties and the United Nations Mediator, relating to the suggestions of 27 June 1948
19
II.
Reply of the Provisional Government of Israel to the Proposal regarding the return of Arab refugees
27
III.
Flight log
28
PART TWO

THE SUPERVISION OF THE TWO TRUCES
I.
Introduction
31
II.
The four-week truce from 11 June to
9 July 1948
32
III.
The truce ordered by the Security Council on
15 July 1948
37
IV.
Observer casualties
42
V.
Some conclusions regarding the truce operation
33
PART THREE

ASSISTANCE TO REFUGEES
I.
Nature of the problem
47
II.
Preliminary survey
47
III.
Immediate relief of basic needs
49
IV.
Short-term planned programme
50
V.
Long-range programme
52
VI.
Conclusions
52
Annexes
I.
Refugees: replies from countries to which telegrams requesting specific commodities were dispatched
54
II.
Refugees: replies from countries to which the general telegram was dispatched
56
Supplies donated by agencies other than Governments to which appeals were sent
57
1. INTRODUCTION

1. The General Assembly, on 14 May 1948, adopted resolution 186 (S-2), providing for a United Nations Mediator on Palestine. Paragraph 2, part II, of this resolution instructed the Mediator "to render progress reports monthly, or more frequently as he deems necessary, to the Security Council and to the Secretary-General for transmission to the Members of the United Nations".

2. Since taking up my responsibilities as United Nations Mediator on Palestine on 21 May 1948, I have submitted a number of reports to the Security Council on specific aspects of the mediation effort, the truce supervision and the refugee problem. These reports, of course, as Security Council documents, have been distributed to all Members of the United Nations. At this stage of my effort I deem it advisable to submit to the Secretary-General, for transmission to the Members of the United Nations, a general progress report which will provide for the Members a broad survey of the developments in Palestine, as they relate to my responsibilities, since the adoption of the resolution on 14 May.

3. I have decided to present the report at this time precisely because the General Assembly will be convening in its third session on 21 September. In the event the Palestine question should be discussed by the General Assembly, I have thought that it might well prove useful to the Members to have before them a first-hand account of the efforts of the Mediator appointed under their resolution and his personal appraisal of the situation.

4. It is my understanding, at the time this report is written, that the question of the future of Palestine has not been placed on the agenda of the forthcoming session of the General Assembly. I would be less than frank if I did not express my personal view that it will be a mistake of tragic consequences if, at this critical period in the history of Palestine and in the intensive effort to achieve a peaceful solution, the question were not to be considered and the necessary decisions taken by the General Assembly.

5. In my view a crucial stage has been reached in the mediation effort. Since my arrival in Cairo on 28 May I have striven ceaselessly to find a common basis upon which peace negotiations between the two parties might be undertaken. I have tried to bring them together in my presence or without it. I have studied carefully their respective positions, claims and contentions, and on the basis of such study have devised compromises which have been put to them either orally or in writing. I have employed abundantly both reason and persuasion, but to date neither agreement between the parties nor a basis for agreement has been found. I do not conclude, however, that the problem of Palestine is insoluble by peaceful means, or that a basis for agreement cannot ultimately be found. But the conclusion is inescapable that at some juncture vital decisions will have to be taken by the General Assembly if a peaceful settlement is to be achieved. I am firmly convinced, after the most careful appraisal, that this juncture has now been reached.

6. An indispensable condition to the settlement of the Palestine question is the cessation of hostilities between the Arab and Jewish forces. Mediation cannot be finally successful so long as either party believes that it can, with relative impunity, resort to armed force and thereby achieve for itself a more favourable settlement. The resolutions of the Security Council of 29 May and 15 July (S/801 and S/902), first calling upon and then ordering the Governments and authorities concerned to desist from further military action in the dispute, have been, broadly speaking, respected, and have brought an end to organized hostilities in Palestine, although the situation admittedly remains tense and uneasy. Except for the nine-day interval between the four-week truce which ended on 9 July and the indefinite truce which began on 18 July, there have been no large-scale military actions in Palestine since 11 June. The contending armed forces have been arrayed across no man's lands which, in spite of persistent efforts by the observers, remain all too narrow; there have been daily incidents of a localized character; and there have been numerous breaches of the terms of the truce by both sides. But the armies are nowhere engaged in battle and the truce for both Arabs and Jews is an accepted, if allegedly unwelcome, fact.

7. The truce, clearly, must at some time be superseded by a settlement. In the minds of both parties, the truce is regarded as only a phase of hostilities. The resolution on the Palestinian question, however, adopted by the Security Council at its 338th meeting on 15 July (S/902), invoking Article 40 of the Charter, ordered the Governments and authorities concerned "to desist from further military action...". This resolution, unlike the four-week truce resolution of 29 May (S/801), fixed no time-limit and decided that "subject to further decision by the Security Council or the General Assembly, the truce shall remain in force... until a peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine is reached". By the terms of this resolution, both parties were permanently enjoined from any further employment of military action in the Palestine dispute. This is clearly understood by both Arab and Jewish authorities. Each understands equally well that the party which would be responsible for a resumption of hostilities would be guilty of open defiance of the order of the Security Council of 18 July, and would thereby incur the risk of action under paragraph 4 of that resolution, which provides that failure to comply with the cease-fire order "would demonstrate the existence of a breach of the peace within the meaning of Article 39 of the Charter requiring immediate consideration by the Security Council with a view to such further action under Chapter VII of the Charter as may be decided upon by the Council".

8. It would be dangerous complacency, however, to take it for granted that with no settlement in sight the truce can be maintained indefinitely. Each side contends that the indefinite truce works to the advantage of the other. The strain on both sides in maintaining the truce under the prevailing tension in Palestine is undoubtedly very great. I am convinced that neither side really wishes to resume the fighting but, on the other hand, neither side appears to be prepared, openly or voluntarily, to surrender its position or to make fundamental concessions. There is the constant danger, which must be faced, that the accumulated irritation from daily incidents, war nerves, the economic strain of maintaining large armies in the field, the pressures of public opinion, and the tendency to despair of any peaceful settlement, may provoke one or the other party to take the foolhardy risk of resuming hostilities in the vain hope of a quick victory. There is also the danger that under the constant pressure of tension, mutual suspicion and recrimination, and in the absence of any enforcement ability by the United Nations representatives, the truce, if too long prolonged in its present indefinite form, will deteriorate into a virtual resumption of hostilities through a mounting number of local incidents widely spread.

9. The two truces have provided a "cooling off" period of relative calm, almost three months in duration at the writing of this report. During that period each side, having had an unpleasant taste of bitter fighting, has had ample opportunity for reflection and review of the position to which it has persistently adhered and the consequence of its action. Each side, of course, contends that the international intervention, insisting on a truce in Palestine, deprived that side of the decisive victory which it was about to achieve in the war. There is undoubtedly a large element of wishful thinking in such contentions, of which both sides have been guilty. Each side also claims that the existing truce works to its disadvantage. In fact, the truces have spared both sides inevitably heavy losses in men and equipment and in expenditures which both sides could ill afford to undertake. There are recent indications of more moderate and sober counsel in at least some important quarters.

10. Although it cannot be said that neither side will fight again under any circumstances, I am strongly of the view that the time is ripe for a settlement. I am reasonably confident that, given the permanent injunction against military action issued by the Security Council, and firm political decisions by the General Assembly, both sides will acquiesce, however reluctantly, in any reasonable settlement on which is placed the stamp of approval of the United Nations. I do not mean to imply that there is at the moment bright prospect for formal agreement between the two parties. But, in my opinion, although such formal agreement would be highly desirable, it is not indispensable to a peaceful settlement at this stage. What is indispensable is that the General Assembly take a firm position on the political aspects of the problem in the light of all the circumstances since its last session, and that its resolution be so reasonable as to discourage any attempt to thwart it and to defy the Security Council order by the employment of armed force.

11. I do not believe that merely prolonging the truce will automatically enhance the prospects for an ultimate peaceful settlement, but I do believe that prompt action by the General Assembly at its third session will greatly strengthen such prospects. The reaction to failure of the General Assembly to consider and take decisions on the question at this critical stage might well prove decisive to this phase of the international effort to ensure peace in Palestine. The effectiveness of the mediation effort necessarily depends in large measure upon the decisions taken by the appropriate organs of the United Nations.

12. Indeed, quite apart from the possibility of Security Council action, such a decision taken by the necessary majority of the United Nations General Assembly should be morally binding on both parties. The Arab States, even if opposed to it in debate and in voting, should, as good Members of the United Nations, recognise a moral obligation to accept the will of the majority according to democratic practice. The Jews, already greatly indebted to international action and as aspirants to membership in the United Nations, should be no less under moral pressure to abide by the majority decision of the Assembly.

13. Certain steps which in my view might be taken in the direction of settlement and conciliation of the differences between the two parties are set forth in the Conclusions to Part One of this report.



II. THE BASIC FACTORS IN THE PALESTINE SITUATION
1. The fundamental issues in Palestine today are partition, the Jewish State, Jewish immigration and Arab refugees. While the formal attitudes of the parties on the first three of these issues have not changed, it is unquestionable that since the adoption by the General Assembly, on 29 November 1947, of resolution 181 (II) providing for the partition of Palestine, there have been changes in the Palestine scene which are so decisively significant as to make some of the prevalent attitudes quite unrealistic.

Partition

2. The resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 29 November 1947 provided not for simple partition of Palestine, but for partition with economic union. It envisaged the creation of an Arab State, a Jewish State, and the City of Jerusalem as a corpus separatum under a special international regime administered by the United Nations. These three entities, largely because of justifiable doubts concerning the economic viability of the proposed Arab State and the City of Jerusalem, were to be linked together in an Economic Union of Palestine. The obvious disadvantages of territorial partition were thus to be corrected to some extent by economic union.

3. Execution of the plan of partition with economic union was possible only if there existed, or there could be fostered or induced, a willingness on the part of both Arabs and Jews in Palestine to co-operate. The chain of unfortunate events which began in Palestine almost immediately after the adoption of the resolution of 29 November demonstrated conclusively not only that the necessary Arab willingness to co-operate was lacking, but that a dangerous antagonism existed which was provoking virtual civil war even before the termination of the Mandate on 15 May 1948. In these ten months since the adoption of the partition resolution it has become increasingly clear that any plan based on the essential assumption of immediate co-operation between Arabs and Jews in Palestine must ignore the harsh facts of existing relationships there.

4. The instant question, therefore, is not whether it may be advisable to review and revise the resolution of 29 November 1947. It has already been outrun and irrevocably revised by the actual facts of recent Palestine history.

The Jewish State

5. The most significant development in the Palestine scene since last November is the fact that the Jewish State is a living, solidly entrenched and vigorous reality. That it enjoys de jure or de facto recognition from an increasing number of States, two of which are permanent members of the Security Council, is an incidental but arresting fact. The Provisional Government of Israel is today exercising, without restrictions on its authority or power, all the attributes of full sovereignty. The Jewish State was not born in peace as was hoped for in the resolution of 29 November, but rather, like many another State in history, in violence and bloodshed. The establishment of this State constitutes the only implementation which has been given to the resolution, and even this was accomplished by a procedure quite contrary to that envisaged for the purpose in the resolution. In establishing their State within a semi-circle of gunfire, the Jews have given a convincing demonstration of their skill and tenacity.

6. As I pointed out in my report to the Security Council of 12 July (S/888, pages 16-17), the Jewish State is "a small State, precariously perched on a coastal shelf with its back to the sea and defiantly facing on three sides a hostile Arab world. Its future may be assessed as uncertain, and if it survives this war its security will be likely to present a serious problem for a good time to come...".

But whatever the future may hold for the infant Jewish State, the inescapable conclusion, today, is that a Jewish State in Palestine, fully sovereign, is actually in existence and that Arab determination to eliminate it could be realized only by armed force in sufficient strength to overwhelm it. In any case, resort to armed force as a means of settling the problem has been prohibited by the Security Council.

7. The most pressing need of the Jewish State since its inception on the termination of the Mandate has been the opportunity to consolidate its position, both internally and externally, and to perfect its administrative and political organization. Born in the throes of war, its road was instantly difficult. Time runs in its favour, and in this regard the two truces have been of especial advantage to the Provisional Government in the sense that the two periods of relative peace afforded it a necessary opportunity for consolidation and organizational development. Above all, the Jewish State needs peace. A new organism of limited resources, its hope for development must very largely depend, in the long run, on the cultivation of peaceful and mutually trusting relations with the neighbouring Arab States whose overwhelming numbers dwarf into insignificance any population total to which the Jewish State may aspire.

The Arab attitude

8. The Arabs, including not only Palestinian Arabs, but those of the seven Arab States, find it extremely difficult to accept even the fact a Jewish State in Palestine. While recognizing the right of many Jews now in Palestine to be there and to remain there as citizens of a Palestinian State, they bitterly reject Jewish nationalistic aspirations for a separate State. That the Arab States made a tragic mistake in employing force in Palestine cannot be questioned. But the very fact that they resorted to this extreme action and were willing to run the risk of thus offending the international community is in itself a measure of the intensity of their feeling on the question.

9. It is fruitless to conjecture whether Arabs or Jews might have won a decisive victory in Palestine had international intervention not brought the fighting to a halt. Jewish forces might have won more territory in Palestine or even all of Palestine, but they could not have conquered the Arab States nor won peace with them. Arab armies by sheer force of numbers, might in time have pressed the Jews to the wall of the sea but there is no indication that they could muster sufficient strength to deliver a mortal blow, and it may well be doubted that this could have been accomplished in view of probable international intervention. Had the war continued it would most likely have ended in a stalemate, which in itself would amount to a Jewish victory. But the United Nations had firmly determined that the war could not go on and that the Palestine dispute must be settled by peaceful means. And that is the Arab dilemma. The Jewish State, established under the cloak of United Nations authority, can be eliminated only by force. The United Nations, however, has decreed that force must not be employed. Therefore, the Arab States must resign themselves to the presence of the Jewish State or pursue the reckless course of defying the United Nations and thereby incurring liabilities the full burden and danger of which cannot be calculated in advance.

10. The combination of Jewish strength and international intervention has decided the issue of the Jewish State. This, of course, does not make it any more palatable to the Arabs. In my opinion, while in no sense condoning the armed intervention of the Arab States, it would be helpful to the solution of the problem if both the international community and the Jews of Israel were to be more understanding of the Arab viewpoint. The Arabs look upon the nationalistic Jews of Palestine as interlopers and aggressors. They point to the fact that the Arab population is the preponderant population of the country and that it has been an Arab country for many centuries. It is at least understandable that, in their fervour, they not only the historical claims of the Jews but even the legal basis for their presence in Palestine which the terms of the Mandate provided.

11. The Arabs also react severely to Jewish immigration into Palestine which they regard as a threat to the Arabs in the whole of Palestine and Transjordan as well. They harbour grave fears that a Jewish State in Palestine will not stay within its defined boundaries, and through population pressure resulting from unlimited immigration, encouragement and support from world Jewry, and burgeoning nationalism, a threat will be posed not only to Palestine but to the entire Arab Near East. A tolerant approach can appreciate the Arab views and fears, although on appraisal they may in large measure be found extravagant and unfounded.

But since the Arabs nurture such viewpoints, no settlement can be on solid foundations unless every reasonable reassurance possible is afforded them, not only by the Jewish State but by the United Nations.

12. The Arabs have consistently advocated a unitary Arab State in Palestine, with full rights and guarantees for the Jewish minority, as the acceptable solution of the Palestine problem. In the light of developments during recent months the Arab position is unrealistic. It may be questioned, in any case, whether the Arab proposal was ever likely to serve the best interests of Palestinian Arabs. At this late stage in the problem and in view of all the circumstances, the cantonal and federal state schemes have no practical merit which would make them worthy of consideration. That territorial, political and economic unity would be highly desirable in Palestine cannot be doubted. That lacking such complete unity, some form political and economic, or at least economic, union would be a reasonable alternative, is also true. But the present antagonism between the Arab and Jewish communities renders impractical, for the moment at least, the application of any such arrangements.

Jewish immigration

13. The issue of Jewish immigration remains a burning issue in Palestine, but in the very nature of the case it is submerged in the larger issue of the existence of the Jewish State. It is entirely natural that the Jewish position, insistent upon a fully sovereign Jewish State, should reject any suggestion of restriction upon the authority of that State to determine its own immigration policy. The Arabs, on the hand, rejecting entirely the concept of the Jewish State, would also deny the right of Jewish immigration into an Arab-dominated Palestine. The settlement of the issue of the Jewish Stare will minimize the international importance of the immigration issue. The Jews, however, in the interest of promoting friendly relations with their Arab neighbours, would do well, in defining their immigration policy, to take carefully into account the basis of Arab fears and to consider measures and policies designed to allay them.

Arab refugees

14. A new and difficult element has entered into the Palestine problem as a result of the exodus of more than 300,000 Arabs from their former homes in Palestine. The measures being taken or contemplated to cope with this problem are described in part III of this report. The question of their ultimate resettlement, either in their former abodes or elsewhere, must be faced and solved. I have affirmed elsewhere in this report that the right of the refugees to return to their homes if they so desire must be safeguarded. Nevertheless, whether or not this right is exercised, most of these refugees will require assistance in some degree to re-establish themselves.

III. RESUME OF THE NEGOTIATIONS
The period 28 May to 15 July

1. My functions as Mediator were defined by resolution 186 (S-2) adopted by the General Assembly at its 135th meeting on 14 May 1948. This resolution empowered the Mediator, inter alia, to "use his good offices with the local and community authorities in Palestine to... Promote a peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine". Paragraph 3, part II, of the resolution directed the Mediator "to conform in his activities with the provisions of this resolution, and with such instructions as the General Assembly or the Security Council may issue".

2. On calling upon all Governments and authorities concerned to order a cessation of all acts of armed force for a period of four weeks, the Security Council, by its resolution of 29 May 1948 (S/801), instructed the Mediator "to make contact with all parties as soon as the cease-fire is in force with a view to carrying out his functions as determined by the General Assembly".

3. Immediately after my arrival in Cairo, on 28 May, I concentrated on the negotiations for establishing the four-week cease-fire called for by the Security Council's resolution of 29 May. As from 15 June, soon after the four-week cease-fire came into force, I undertook exploratory discussions with representatives of the parties at Cairo and Tel-Aviv on the broad question of the future of Palestine. In Cairo, the Political Committee of the Arab League set up a Sub-Committee, consisting of the Prime Ministers of Egypt, Transjordan and Lebanon, and the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, to negotiate with me. In Tel-Aviv I consulted with the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Provisional Government of Israel. From these discussions, in the course of which both sides set forth their claims, positions and objectives with regard to partition, Jewish immigration into Palestine, and the status of Jerusalem, it was immediately apparent that the time was probably not yet ripe for any agreement on these fundamental issues. The four-week truce had come into effect after a short period of fighting, and the parties were in no mood for compromise. The opinions expressed regarding the future of Palestine were very divergent, and there was no softening of the position of either side on the fundamental issues. While the Arabs retained their firm stand against partition of any kind, the Jews were equally adamant in their attitude as regards an independent Jewish State, in accordance with Assembly resolution 181 (II) of 29 November 1947, and towards unrestricted immigration. However, in the course of the truce negotiations, the two parties had made it quite clear that they expected to receive from me, during the period of the truce, an indication of my ideas as to a possible basis of settlement. This, in their opinion, was the raison d'etre of the truce. Notwithstanding, therefore, the complete divergence of aims and the very short time left at my disposal, I decided to submit to the two parties a set of tentative suggestions, with the primary intention to discover whether there might be found at this stage a common ground on which further discussion and mediation could proceed. It was my purpose to keep negotiations as fluid as possible, in the belief that the premature submission of formal proposals, and their probable rejection, might well destroy any chance of extending the truce, or even of maintaining it to the end of the four-week period.

4. The Arabs having refused my suggestion for a joint round-table conference, I invited the two parties to make available to me, at Rhodes, experts on the working level, not for political decisions but for consultation and technical information concerning the positions of their respective sides. Both parties accepted, and four Arab and two Jewish experts arrived in Rhodes on 21 and 23 June respectively, and consultations were held separately, lasting until 25 June.

5. On the basis of close analysis of the question and of ideas which emerged during the discussion, I presented to the parties, on 28 and 29 June respectively, under cover of my letter of 27 June (S/863), three brief papers, setting forth in outline my suggestions for a possible approach to the peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine. These suggestions were as follows:

"(1) That, subject to the willingness of the directly interested parties to consider such an arrangement, Palestine, as defined in the original Mandate entrusted to the United Kingdom in 1922, that is, including Transjordan, might form a union comprising two members, one Arab and one Jewish.

"(2) That the boundaries of the two members be determined in the first instance by negotiation with the assistance of the Mediator and on the basis of suggestions to be made by him. When agreement is reached on the main outlines of the boundaries, they v will be definitively fixed by a boundaries commission.

"(3) That the purposes and functions of the union should be to promote common economic interests, to operate and maintain common services, including customs and excise, to undertake development projects, and to coordinate foreign policy and measures for common defence.

"(4) That the functions and authority of the union might be exercised through a central council and such other organs as the members of the union may determine.

"(5) That, subject to the provisions of the instrument of union, each member of the union may exercise full control over its own affairs, including its foreign relations.

"(6) That immigration within its own borders should be within the competence of each member, provided that, following a period of two years from the establishment of the union, either member would be entitled to request the council of the union to review the immigration policy of the other member and to render a ruling thereon in terms of the common interests of the union. In the event of the inability of the council to reach a decision on the matter, the issue could be referred by either member to the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, whose decision, taking into account the principle of economic absorptive capacity, would be binding on the member whose policy is at issue.

"(7) That religious and minority rights be fully protected by each member of the Union and guaranteed by the United Nations.

"(8) That Holy Places, religious buildings and sites be preserved, and that existing rights in respect of the same be fully guaranteed by each member of the Union.

"(9) That recognition be accorded to the right of residents of Palestine who, because of conditions created by the conflict there have left their normal places of abode, to return to their homes without restriction and to regain possession of their property."

6. Suggestions regarding territorial matters, presented in an annex, were as follows:

"With regard to paragraph 2 of the suggestions, it is considered that certain territorial arrangements might be worthy of consideration. These might be along the following lines:

"(1) Inclusion of the whole or part of the Negeb in Arab territory.

"(2) Inclusion of the whole or part of Western Galilee in Jewish territory.

"(3) Inclusion of the City of Jerusalem in Arab territory, with municipal autonomy for the Jewish community and special arrangements for the protection of the Holy Places.

"(4) Consideration of the status of Jaffa.

"(5) Establishment of a free port at Haifa, the area of the free port to include the refineries and terminals.

"(6) Establishment of a free airport at Lydda."

7. With regard to the formulation of the above suggestions, I reported to the Security Council on 12 July 1948 (S/888), as follows:

"(22) The resolution of the General Assembly of 14 May empowered the Mediator to use his good offices to 'promote a peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine'. The indispensable condition for the attainment of this objective would be to find some common framework of reference within which the parties would be willing to accept further mediation. In accepted international usage the employment of 'good offices' involves offering friendly suggestions to facilitate adjustment of a controversy between conflicting parties. Mediation is a consequence of the tender of good offices, and the primary task of the Mediator is to initiate proposals calculated to harmonize conflicting interests and claims. In the very nature of the case, therefore, the Mediator must strive to encourage compromise rather than strict adherence to legal principles. As indicated in article 4 of part II of The Hague Convention on the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, 'the part of the mediator consists in reconciling the opposing claims and appeasing the feelings of resentment which may have arisen...' It is equally true that the Mediator can achieve success only by achieving voluntary agreement between the parties. His decisions have no binding effect and his suggestions or proposals may be rejected at will by the parties. It was on this basis that my suggestions of 27 June were put forth. In the introductory statement to those suggestions (S/863) I pointed out that:

" 'I interpret my role as Mediator not as one involving the handing down of decisions on the future of Palestine, but as one of offering suggestions on the basis of which further discussions might take place and possibly counter-suggestions be put forth looking toward a peaceful settlement of this difficult problem. My suggestions at this stage, then, must clearly be of such nature as to provide a reasonable framework of reference within which the two parties may find it possible to continue their consultations with me toward the end of a peaceful adjustment.'

"(23) The suggestions which I offered on 27 June as a possible focus of discussion had been formulated on the basis of the equities involved in the Palestine dispute - the aspirations, fears and motivations of the conflicting parties - and the realities of the existing situation in Palestine. I could not call upon either party to surrender completely its position, not only because this would be a betrayal of my role as Mediator, but also because there was no sound basis for doing so in the light of all the circumstances. It was fully realized, of course, that there could be no possibility of a peaceful adjustment of the dispute unless there was at least a moderate willingness on the part of both parties to explore all the avenues for a peaceful adjustment, and unless both of them were prepared, at some stage, to forego armed force as a means of attaining their objectives.

"(24) As Mediator, I had to seek possible solutions which would be voluntarily accepted by both parties. I sought, therefore, arrangements which might reveal some common denominator in the relations between Arabs and Jews in Palestine. In my talks with them, both parties freely admitted the utter necessity for peaceful relations between Arabs and Jews in Palestine, and both admitted the importance of economic unity in the country."

8. As already mentioned, the respective parties were not called upon to accept or reject the suggestions in the form in which they were offered, but were merely invited to indicate whether further discussions might profitably be carried on within the general framework outlined. Both parties, however in their replies rejected the framework suggested as a basis for discussion and uncompromisingly reaffirmed their respective positions. The full texts of the exchanges of views are appended as annex I.

9. The Provisional Government of Israel, in a letter dated 5 July 1948, objected to the deviations from the General Assembly resolution of 29 November 1947, and particularly to the suggestions concerning the regulation of immigration and the status of Jerusalem. They offered no counter-suggestions but urged a reconsideration of my "whole approach to the problem". In a letter to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Provisional Government of Israel, dated 6 July 1948, I commented as follows:

"(3) In paragraph I of your letter it is stated that my suggestions {appear to ignore the resolution of the General Assembly of 29 November I947...' I cannot accept this statement. As United Nations Mediator, it is true that I have not considered myself bound by the provisions of the 29 November resolution, since, had I done so, there would have been no meaning to my mediation. The failure to implement the resolution of 29 November 1947, and the open hostilities to which the Arab opposition to it led, resulted in convoking of the second special session of the General Assembly to 'consider further the future government of Palestine'. This special Assembly, taking into account the new situation, adopted, on 14 May 1948, the resolution providing for a Mediator. It is equally true, however, that the basic objectives of the resolution of 29 November 1947 as regards a separate political and institutional existence for the Jewish and Arab communities of Palestine and for close economic ties between these communities, are maintained in my suggestions, although in a somewhat different framework. I may also assure you that in working up my suggestions I took fully into account the facts of the actual existence of the Jewish State in a defined area, the military situation and the present territorial situation as a result of the conflict thus far. But I could not ignore the fact that there is nothing really stable in Palestine so long as the prospect of early resumption of hostilities remains, and that the violent reaction of the Arab world to these very situations is also a vital factor in the equation, if one must focus on the possibility of peaceful adjustment.


"(7) Paragraph 3 of your letter relates to immigration. The question of immigration into Palestine must be considered within the context of the total problem. Even within the limits of full sovereignty the question of immigration is related to the absorptive capacity of the country. Palestine from this point of view has become the object of international concern. It would, therefore, seem justifiable that the Economic and Social Council might be given an eventual say in the matter. Furthermore, such an arrangement might serve the useful purpose of maintaining a sympathetic international interest in and assistance for the settlement of Jewish immigrants in Palestine. Should unrestricted immigration indefinitely continue in Palestine there might, in the future, arise a serious economic and political problem beyond the control of any Jewish government. It cannot be ignored that immigration affects not only the Jewish State and the Jewish people but also the surrounding Arab world.

"(8) Jerusalem stands in the heart of what must be Arab territory in any partition of Palestine. To attempt to isolate this area politically and otherwise from surrounding territory presents enormous difficulties. The special condition of Jerusalem -- its large Jewish population and its religious associations -- needs special consideration, and the way for discussion of these questions was left open. Arab domination of legitimate Jewish and other non-Arab interests in Jerusalem was never intended or implied in the suggestions. Moreover, while I fully appreciate that the question of Jerusalem is of very great concern, for historical and other reasons, to the Jewish community of Palestine, Jerusalem was never intended to be a part of the Jewish State. In this sense, the position of the Jewish State is unaffected and the question of Jerusalem has no relationship to its status. The status of Jerusalem, therefore, is separate from the question of the constitution and boundaries of a Jewish State. My suggestions fully safeguard the historical and world-wide religious interests in Jerusalem."

10. The Arabs, by a letter dated 3 July 1948, signed by the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, offered counter suggestions which incorporated in outline the basic principles of the Arab position. These counter-suggestions, providing for a unitary State in the whole of Palestine, offered little or no compromise.

11. With regard to these counter-suggestions, I submitted to the Arab representatives, by letter dated 5 July 1948, the following commentary:

"It may be contended with considerable cogency that the creation of a unitary and sovereign State in Palestine with the processes of government based on proportional representation, is fully consistent with democratic principles and procedures. But this does overlook certain vital facts which are peculiar to Palestine. The Jews of Palestine have been all along, and are now in fact, a completely separate cultural and political community. Under the Mandate they were permitted to maintain their separate and virtually autonomous cultural and political institutions. Moreover, this Jewish community, from whatever motives and for whatever reasons, is imbued with an intensely nationalist spirit, a nationalism which rivals in intensity the nationalism of Palestinian Arabs.

"A unitary State of Palestine with a substantial minority population of this kind could only be a troubled State unless the minority population and its nationalist aspirations were thoroughly crushed by forceful measures. It is futile to assume that the Jewish community could undergo a rapid change of heart.

"You will understand, of course, that I have come to this problem as a Mediator. I have come to try to mediate a dispute between two parties locked in violent conflict. And what do I find? I find in Palestine a substantial area which is fully under Jewish control, proclaimed as the territory of a Jewish State, and with a Provisional Government which has been recognized by a number of States. Whatever may be the merits of its existence or the conclusions as to how this Jewish political entity came to be, the fact remains that it is there.

"Now, in your counter-suggestions it is proposed to eliminate this separate Jewish political entity by creating a unitary State in the whole of Palestine. But there is no suggestion as to how this is to be done. May I inquire whether there are any views as to how this might be done by peaceful means? As Mediator I am directed by the resolution of the General Assembly "to promote a peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine". I am fully convinced that there is no possibility whatsoever of persuading or inducing the Jews to give up their present separate cultural and political existence and accept merging in a unitary Palestine in which they would be a permanent minority. The alternative method of achieving the Arab objective would be to wipe out the Jewish State and its Provisional Government by force. This course, as Mediator, I obviously cannot recommend."

12. On 9 July, as a result of the Arab refusal to prolong the truce, hostilities started again, and I went immediately to Lake Success in order to acquaint the Security Council fully with the situation and to request its prompt and effective intervention.

The period since 15 July

13. The resolution of the Security Council of 15 July (S/902), ordering the Governments and authorities concerned to desist from further military action, also urged "upon the parties that they continue conversations with the Mediator in a spirit of conciliation and mutual concessions in order that all points under dispute may be settled peacefully".

14. Following my return to Rhodes on 19 July, after my short visit to Lake Success to attend the meetings of the Security Council, I consulted with Arab leaders on different occasions at Beirut, Amman and Alexandria. These conversations persuaded me that while the Arab States would maintain the truce, they would reject any suggestion of acceptance or recognition of the Jewish State, and would not meet with Jewish representatives. The Arab leaders had become greatly concerned and incensed about the mounting distress among the huge number of Arab refugees. They considered the solution of this problem fundamental to a settlement of the Palestine question. I recognized that, in the Arab States, public opinion on the Palestine question was considerably agitated and that each of my visits to Arab capitals projected the question into prominence in the Arab Press. I decided, therefore, in addition to the truce supervision, to concentrate my efforts in the immediate future on the problem of refugees and the demilitarization of Jerusalem, since no useful purpose could be served by taking precipitate action in forcing matters to a head. I concluded that a short "cooling-off" period as regards the basic political problems might best serve the cause of later mediation. I decided therefore, in the circumstances, that I could fulfil my previous commitment to attend the International Red Cross Conference in Stockholm. While there I would use the opportunity afforded by this Conference to further United Nations action in favour of immediate relief for Arab refugees.

15. The two visits which I paid to Tel-Aviv, at the end of July and early in August, made it apparent that the Jewish attitude had stiffened in the interval between the two truces, that Jewish in the settlement would probably be more ambitious, and that Jewish opinion was less receptive to mediation. A feeling of greater confidence and independence had grown out of Jewish military efforts during the interval between the two truces. Less reliance was placed in the United Nations and there was a growing tendency to criticize its shortcomings with regard to Palestine.

16. Following my return to Rhodes from Stockholm on 3 September, I undertook further talks with Arab and Jewish leaders in Alexandria, an and Tel-Aviv in the period 6 to 9 September. These talks revealed that there was, at least for the time being, no prospect of voluntary agreement between the disputants, nor any willingness on the part of Arabs to negotiate with the Jews either directly or through the Mediator. But I did sense a more moderate and reasonable atmosphere in all quarters and a tendency to discuss more realistically the basic problems.

17. As a result of these talks, I became convinced: (a) that it would be of utmost urgency that the General Assembly consider and reach decisions upon the Palestine question at its forthcoming session; (b) that if the General Assembly should reach firm and equitable decisions on the principal political issues there would be a reasonable prospect that settlement could be achieved if not by formal at least by tacit acceptance; and (c) that the truce could be maintained with reasonable fidelity throughout the General Assembly session but that it might be gravely doubted that it could be indefinitely prolonged beyond then in the absence of tangible progress toward a settlement.

18. The flight log of the special plane made available to me by the Secretary-General in connexion with the mediation effort, and without which my task would have been virtually impossible, is appended as annex III.

The Provisional Government's offer of direct negotiation

19. On 6 August 1948, Mr. Shertok, the Foreign Minister of the Provisional Government of Israel, requested me to transmit to the "Governments of the Arab States now at war with Israel our offer that their representatives should meet the representatives of the Provisional Government of Israel for the purpose of peace negotiations". I complied with this request, cabling the Arab Governments concerned and stating that I was ready to transmit their reply to the Provisional Government of Israel. Replies were subsequently received from the Governments of Syria, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia, indicating that the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States would reply on their behalf. I have received no written reply but I was informed orally by the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States in Alexandria, on 6 September, that the Arab representatives were unwilling to enter into direct negotiations with representatives of the Provisional Government of Israel. I had also previously received a written reply, dated 11 August, from the Foreign Minister of Egypt, to the effect that the Egyptian Government had accepted the ceasefire ordered in the resolutions of 29 May and 15 July out of respect for the actions of the Security Council, and that, under these resolutions, the Mediator had been charged with the task of seeking a peaceful solution. The Egyptian Government could not recognize the authority of the so-called State of Israel and therefore considered it unnecessary to reply.

20. For my part, as I had on several occasions stated to both parties, I would welcome direct negotiations at my time the parties could agree to hold them, though I was well aware that at this particular time such an offer was probably premature since I had just discussed the question of settlement with the Arabs. I am convinced, however, that the offer was sincerely made. It had recently been brought to my attention by both Arab and Jewish officials that other offers for direct negotiations have been transmitted by Jewish representatives directly to Arab authorities. I have reaffirmed to both Arab and Jewish authorities that I would be very pleased should they find it possible to enter into direct negotiations and that I am prepared to offer every possible assistance toward that end.

IV. DEMILITARIZATION OF JERUSALEM
1. Jerusalem had greatly suffered during the period between the British evacuation and the entry into force of the first truce. When the latter began, the Old City was entirely in Arab hands, but by far the greater part of the New City was occupied by Jewish forces. Front lines were interlocked, with dangerous pockets and narrow no man's lands. In any general fighting in Jerusalem it was clear that the Old City in which are found most of the Holy Places, would not be spared. The destruction of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, the Dome of the Rock or the Wailing Wall would be an irreparable loss. It would also inflame deep-rooted religious passions.

2. The success of the negotiations which resulted on 7 July in the agreement on the demilitarization of the Mount Scopus area encouraged me to press for an agreement covering a much wider area, namely that of the City of Jerusalem as delimited inn General Assembly resolution 181 (II) of 29 November 1947 or, if this proved impossible, a smaller area of the city.

3. The end of the four-week truce was imminent. On 3 July a proposal was presented to the Special Sub-Committee of the Arab League in Cairo. A similar communication was addressed to Tel-Aviv. Under this proposal, an instrument was to be signed by both parties. It would contain provisions concerning the extent of the area to be demilitarized, the position and functions of United Nations bodies which might be used in the supervision of the demilitarization, the procedure of demilitarization, the prohibition of military operations in the demilitarized area, the prohibition of the entry of fighting personnel, prohibition of the entry of arms, ammunition and other military supplies, the rights of the civilian population, the entry of food, water and other civilian supplies, and access to the Holy Places.

4. While the Provisional Government of Israel was prepared to discuss the proposal under certain assumptions, the Arab States found it unacceptable as a whole. An emergency proposal was then made to the effect that, should the truce not be prolonged, the two parties should agree on an immediate cease-fire in Jerusalem pending a final decision on the question of demilitarization. The Provisional Government was ready to accept this proposal. The Arab States, through the Secretary-General of the Arab League, stated, on the other hand, that since they found unacceptable the proposal for the demilitarization of Jerusalem as a whole, they could not accept the proposal that, should the truce not be prolonged, there should be an immediate cease-fire in the City for the purpose of considering demilitarization.

5. I reported these facts to the Security Council in my report dated 12 July (S/888).

6. On 15 July, the Security Council, in its resolution ordering a new and indefinite truce in Palestine, also ordered "as a matter of special and urgent necessity an immediate and unconditional cease-fire in the City of Jerusalem (S/902). It further instructed the Mediator "to continue his efforts to bring about the demilitarization of the City of Jerusalem, without prejudice to the future political status of Jerusalem".

7. In the telegram containing their acceptance of that part of the Security Council's resolution concerning the cease-fire in Jerusalem the Political Committee of the Arab League stated that they had, given the necessary orders to their forces "on the understanding that talks would take place between the Arab States and the United Nations Mediator with a view to reaching an agreement to ensure security in Jerusalem without prejudice to the future or the position and rights of Arabs in that city". Despite an understanding to the contrary on the basis of my talks in Cairo on 3 July, the telegram also stated that "when the United, Nations Mediator proposed on 3 July to demilitarize Jerusalem, the Arab States accepted the proposal, in principle".

8. In view of the fact that before the end of the first truce the Provisional Government of Israel had stated that it was prepared to discuss the proposal for the demilitarization of Jerusalem under certain assumptions, it seemed that negotiations with the two parties could be resumed under favourable conditions. Draft suggestions in the form of a working paper were then communicated to both parties as a basis for technical discussion.

9. On the Arab side, the Chairman and the Secretary of the Palestine Arab Higher Committee sent to me, from Damascus, on 25 July, a copy of the statement which they had communicated to the Governments of the Arab States asking them to reject in toto the proposal to demilitarize Jerusalem which "tends to obliterate its Arab and Islamic character, detach it from Palestine and establish an international administration therein, thus implementing the partition scheme. Furthermore, it is impossible actually to disarm the Jews, thus exposing the Holy City to their occupation".

10. The official answer of the Arab States transmitted to me by the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States on 31 July did not use the word "demilitarization". It stated: "The Arab States agree that there shall be a permanent cease-fire in Jerusalem to the end that this City shall be removed from the conflict without prejudice to the position and rights of the Arabs on to the ultimate status of the city in the settlement of the Palestine problem. Needless to emphasize that this objective cannot be attained unless the other side is ready not to attack the city or to exercise in it any military or paramilitary activities."

11. On the Jewish side, a communication signed by Mr. Shertok and dated 28 July 1948, read as follows: "(1) the Provisional Government reaffirms its rejection of the Mediator's plan of demilitarization... assumes that this particular scheme no longer stands; (2) the attitude of the Provisional Government to any plan of demilitarization emanating from the Mediator cannot but be influenced by the fact that the Mediator has proposed to place Jerusalem ultimately under Arab rule and that he has not withdrawn that proposal; (3) the Provisional Government is ready, as before, to examine such scheme which, without prejudging the ultimate settlement of the problem of Jerusalem or prejudicing the vital interests of the Jewish people in the Holy City, would protect it from further destruction in the event of hostilities being resumed in other parts of Palestine ". It had previously been made clear to Mr. Shertok that the question at issue was solely acceptance or rejection of the principle of demilitarization without reference to the working paper or any plan.

12. The above-quoted reply from Tel-Aviv appeared to indicate that the Jewish position regarding demilitarization had altered since the end of the first truce and raised the question whether the principle of demilitarization was still accepted by the Provisional Government. In answer to a request for clarification, Mr. Shertok replied that point (3) of his letter, quoted under paragraph II above, meant "acceptance in principle of any scheme which will ensure results desired". Demilitarization was not excluded ".

13. On the basis of this answer, I requested Dr. Bernard Joseph, the representative in Jerusalem of the Provisional Government, to discuss with my representatives in the city the basic principles and, subsequently, the details of a demilitarization plan. After consulting Mr. Shertok, Dr. Joseph pointed out -on 3 August, that what the former had said was that "our Government's readiness to discuss any plan did not exclude the possibility of such plans including the demilitarization of Jerusalem. He (Mr. Shertok) did not go so far as to say that our Government agreed in principle that Jerusalem should be demilitarized ". And Dr. Joseph concluded {sin these circumstances, I would be going beyond the decision of our Government if, at this stage, I entered into negotiations or discussions with a view to elaborating an actual plan of demilitarization. On the other hand, if any plan with regard to the future of Palestine is put before our Government, even though it includes the demilitarization of the city as one of its objects, it will receive the most careful consideration."

14. The above communication was especially regrettable in view of the fact that the Arab reply to the identical request to enter into discussion with my representatives was in the affirmative, and was even accompanied by "notes on the demilitarization of Jerusalem" which could facilitate the discussion.

15. The worsening of the situation in Jerusalem, where heavy firing had been occurring nearly every night, compelled me at that time (early August) to concentrate my efforts on securing a permanent and unconditional ceasefire in the city both as an emergency measure and as a prerequisite to any further attempt at agreement on demilitarization.

16. On 19 August, I sent to the Security Council, on the eve of its adjournment at Lake Success, an interim report regarding the demilitarization of Jerusalem (S/979). I pointed out that the recent Jewish attitude, in my opinion, was due more to political reasons relating to the future status of Jerusalem than to mere military considerations regarding the present conflict". The attitude of the parties was not, however, the only obstacle: "even if both parties were to agree on the issue, demilitarization could not be put into effect without a strong adequately armed United Nations force to be provided immediately. Under these conditions, I wish to inform you that I have serious doubts whether demilitarization can be attained in the near future".

17. This report was promptly discussed by the Security Council and as a result of this discussion the President of the Security Council informed me by cable that the Security Council "desires to state that it relies on the Mediator to make all efforts to achieve speedy results on this matter (the demilitarization of Jerusalem) to which the Security Council attaches serious importance."

18. Since my return from Stockholm, l have renewed my efforts towards the demilitarization of Jerusalem. In my discussion on the subject with Mr. Shertok in Tel-Aviv on 9 September, I pointed out that it was useless for me to make further representations to the Security Council concerning the need for a United Nations armed force in a demilitarized Jerusalem less the Jewish as well as Arab authorities were willing to accept demilitarization in principle as a prelude to detailed discussions.

V. REFUGEES
1. The question of refugees is considered in this part of the report only from the political point of view. The humanitarian and administrative aspects of this problem are dealt with in detail in part III of this report.

2. As a result of the hostilities in Palestine, an alarming number of persons have been displaced from their homes. Arabs form the vast majority of the refugees in Palestine and the neighbouring countries The future of these Arab refugees is one of the questions under dispute, the solution of which presents very great difficulties.

3. From the start, I held the firm view that, taking into consideration all the circumstances, the right of these refugees to return to their homes at the earliest practical date should be established. With this consideration in mind, following an exploratory conversation on the matter with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Provisional Government of Israel on 26 July 1948, in Tel-Aviv, I submitted to him by cable from Rhodes on the same day the following proposal:

"The resolution of the Security Council of 15 July urges the parties to continue their 'conversations with the Mediator in a spirit of conciliation and mutual concession, in order that all points under dispute may be settled peacefully'. As indicated in my conversation with Mr. Shertok in Tel-Aviv on 26 July, one of the points under dispute is the return to their homes in Jewish-controlled area of Palestine of Arab refugees who fled because of war conditions.

"I am deeply concerned with the plight of some three hundred thousand Arab refugees scattered in Arab countries and Arab-controlled areas of Palestine. Their suffering will be intensified when winter comes. Most of them left practically all of their possessions behind and have no means at their disposal.

"I recognize the basis for the misgivings the Provisional Government might have with regard to the return of large numbers of these refugees during the war. These misgivings derive from security as well as economic and political considerations. But I must point out that the existing truce in Palestine is of indefinite duration and that the Security Council resolution has ordered the Governments and authorities concerned to desist from further military action.

"For humanitarian reasons and because I consider the principle sound and the danger to Jewish security slight, I make the following proposals:

"(1) That, without prejudice to the question of the ultimate right of all Arab refugees to return to their homes in Jewish-controlled Palestine if they desire, the principle be accepted that, from among those who may desire to so, a limited number, to be determined in consultation with the Mediator, and especially those formerly living in Jaffa and Haifa, be permitted to return to their homes as from 15 August.

"(2) That, among those who may wish to return, differentiation may be made between men of military age and all others in recognition of security considerations.

"(3) That the Mediator undertake to enlist the aid of appropriate international organizations and agencies in the resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the returning refugees".

4. These proposals were rejected by the Provisional Government of Israel in a reply received on 1 August. In this reply, the Provisional Government of Israel pointed out that it was aware of the serious plight of Arab refugees, but that action taken to deal with the problem on purely humanitarian grounds in disregard of its metro, political and economic aspects might even aggravate this problem. In the circumstances of the truce, security considerations alone make it impossible for the Provisional Government to agree to the Mediator's proposal. The problem could only be considered by the Provisional Government when the Arab States are ready to conclude a peace treaty with the State of Israel. The full text of this reply (S/949) is to be found in annex II.

5. On the receipt of the Jewish reply, I reported to the Security Council on the question (S/948), reiterating that, notwithstanding the views expressed by the Provisional Government of Israel, it was my firm view that the right of the refugees to return to their homes at the earliest practicable date should be affirmed.

6. It is not yet known what the policy of the Provisional Government of Israel with regard to the return of Arab refugees will be when the final terms of settlement are reached. It is, however, undeniable that no settlement can be just and complete if recognition is not accorded to the right of the Arab refugee to return to the home from which he has been dislodged by the hazards and strategy of the armed conflict between Arabs and Jews in Palestine. The majority of these refugees have come from territory which, under the Assembly resolution of 29 November, was to be included in the Jewish State. The exodus of Palestinian Arabs resulted from panic created by fighting in their communities, by rumours concerning real or alleged acts of terrorism, or expulsion. It would be an offence against the principles of elemental justice if these innocent victims of the conflict were denied the right to return to their homes while Jewish immigrants flow into Palestine, and, indeed, at least offer the threat of permanent replacement of the Arab refugees who have been rooted in the land for centuries.

7. There have been numerous reports from reliable sources of large-scale looting, pillaging and plundering, and of instances of destruction of villages without apparent military necessity. The liability of the Provisional Government of Israel to restore private property to its Arab owners and to indemnify those owners for property wantonly destroyed is clear, irrespective of any indemnities which the Provisional Government may claim from the Arab States.

8. It must not be supposed, however, that the establishment of the right of refugees to return to their former homes provides a solution of the problem. The vast majority of the refugees may no longer have homes to return to and their resettlement in the State of Israel presents an economic and social problem of special complexity. Whether the refugees are resettled in the State of Israel or in one or other of the Arab States, a major question to be faced is that of placing them in an environment in which they can find employment and the means of livelihood. But in any case their unconditional right to make a free choice should be fully respected.

VI. THE RESOLUTION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF 29 NOVEMBER 1947

Arab and Jewish attitudes

1. General Assembly resolution 181 (II) of 29 November 1947 provided for the partition of Palestine into a Jewish State, an Arab State and an international territory of the City of Jerusalem, within the framework of an economic union embracing all three. This plan was accepted by the representatives of the Jewish Agency but rejected by the Arab States and the spokesman of the Arab Higher Committee, who declared that they did not consider themselves bound by the resolution. On 14 May 1948, the Jews declared the existence of a State of Israel, and when on the following day the Mandate officially ended, the newly-proclaimed Provisional Government of Israel was in control of the most important parts of the area allotted to the Jewish State by the Assembly resolution. The Provisional Government of Israel claimed that it was acting according to that resolution as far as circumstances permitted, and that it made no claim to territory beyond the boundaries of the partition resolution. When the armies of the Arab States entered Palestine on 15 May, and became involved in conflict with the Jewish forces, the Provisional Government of Israel appealed to the Security Council against the attack of the Arab States and invoked the resolution of 29 November.

2. The Arab States, on the other hand, claiming that the resolution of the Assembly was illegal and unjust, contended that they had come legitimately to the assistance of the Arabs of Palestine. Their opposition to the resolution of 29 November has continued unabated.

3. The Provisional Government of Israel, according to recent pronouncements, has apparently modified its attitude to the resolution of 29 November. Although the general position of the Provisional Government of Israel rests broadly on the foundation of the Assembly resolution, it is now being urged that boundaries should be modified to take more fully into account both the present military situation and the necessity for more readily defensible frontiers. In regard to Jerusalem, there is a more sceptical attitude towards internationalization and a marked tendency to press for the inclusion of at least the Jewish part of Jerusalem in the State of Israel

Economic Union

4. An essential feature of the plan of partition was the integration of the three proposed territorial entities into an economic union, by which the unity of the former mandated territory was to be preserved in respect of customs, currency and transport and communications. Such a union could, however, only function by agreement, tacit or expressed, between the parties. An economic union cannot be imposed on a completely unwilling partner, and the fact of Arab unwillingness to co-operate has inhibited the realization of the resolution of 29 November in one of its most essential features.

The boundary provisions

5. The boundary provisions of the General Assembly's resolution were also designed within the framework of economic union, which presupposes full freedom of transit, and therefore within that framework, no difficulty was foreseen in providing for separated parts of the Jewish and Arab States joined to their other parts merely at points of intersection of frontiers. This arrangement, while rational within the framework of an economic union, is open to serious objections if no such union exists. The assumptions of the Assembly resolution largely excluded military considerations in the determination of the boundaries between the three parts of Palestine. Also the proposed boundaries were related to the then existing distribution of population, a distribution which temporarily, at least, has been significantly affected by the large-scale movements of Arab refugees.

The proposed Arab State

6. The effective establishment of a Jewish State in an area which corresponds in large measure to that envisaged in the partition plan has already been accomplished by the events of the past few months. As regards the parts of Palestine under Arab control, no central authority exists and no independent Arab State has been organized or attempted. This situation may be explained in part by Arab unwillingness to undertake any step which would suggest even tacit acceptance of partition, and by their insistence on a unitary State in Palestine. The partition plan presumed that effective organs of State government could be more or less immediately set up in the Arab part of Palestine. This does not seem possible today, in view of the lack of organized authority springing from Arab Palestine itself, and the administrative disintegration following the termination of the Mandate.

7. The partition plan took into account that a partition of Palestine without economic union would leave the Arab State economically nonviable, unless the population should be forced to submit to a substantial fall in its standard of living. This problem was met in the partition plan by economic union, which, by maintaining the essential economic unity of the whole area, attempted to ensure that the flow of capital and labour and the consequent distribution of economic activity would not be greatly influenced by partition. Further, it attempted to meet a substantial fall in standards of social and public services in the Arab State by including the whole area in a single customs union, and by providing for a division of the revenues of the union in such a manner as to offset materially the effects of partition on the distribution of public expenditure and revenue.

8. A Jewish State, whose boundaries have not yet been established, has come into existence, although not in the manner envisaged in the resolution of 29 November. Thus, there now exists in Palestine a form of partition, though an Arab State, for which the partition plan provided has not materialized and there is no economic union. The problem of the future of the Arab part of Palestine and its economic viability is therefore thrust into the foreground.

The problem of Jerusalem

9. The Assembly resolution of 29 November provided that Jerusalem and the surrounding area, including Bethlehem, should be established as a corpus separatum under a special international regime, which also was to be an integral part of the economic union. It is quite evident that an area as small as this could hardly exist as a separate entity unless economically integrated into the larger surrounding territory. Such integration would have been effectively provided by the economic union, which guaranteed freedom of transit and the maintenance of a unified system of transport and communications. It also provided for adequate public revenue for the area by the reversion to it of a 5 to 1O per cent share of the revenues of the economic union. In so far, therefore, as the complexity of interests involved may require the treatment of Jerusalem as a special case by the creation of an international regime, and since economic union is not immediately practicable, the problem of economic viability assumes great importance.

VII. PROTECTION OF THE HOLY PLACES; COMMON SERVICES

1. By the provisions of resolution 186 (S/2), adopted by the General Assembly on 14 May, the Mediator was to use his good offices not only to "promote a peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine", but also to "arrange for the operation of common services necessary to the safety and well-being of the population" and to "assure the protection of the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites in Palestine".

Protection of the Holy Places

2. Authorities on both sides have tried to preserve and protect the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites. Many religious buildings, however, are located in areas where heavy fighting has occurred, and some of them have been destroyed. Synagogues have thus been demolished in the Jewish quarter of the Old City of Jerusalem. Even during the present truce Jerusalem remains a critical spot where shelling by mortars and artillery in various parts of the city frequently takes place. Thus the Holy Places are in constant danger. Damage to many such structures cannot be fully repaired under existing conditions and further deterioration will occur. Military authorities have requisitioned many hospitals, hospices and schools belonging to religious orders. The Church of the Holy Sepulchre has been hit once, with no appreciable damage. The Church of Dormition in the Old City has been severely hit, but its walls are still standing. The Mount of Olives and the Garden of Gethsemane have been spared and their religious buildings remain intact. The Haram-esh-Sharif, including the Dome of the Rock, has suffered damage from shelling. Windows have been broken and inlaid work shattered. The Church of the Nativity and other religious sites in Bethlehem have suffered no damage.

3. Apart from the efforts of official authorities on both sides, the protection of the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites has been assured to the extent possible, particularly in Jerusalem, by the intervention of the United Nations observers. Representations regarding attacks against or the military occupation and use of religious buildings in the Jerusalem front lines have also been made by the Truce Commission.

4. The demilitarization of Jerusalem, more than any other action, would ensure the safety of its Holy Places and religious buildings.

Common services

5. As regards common services, arrangements for their operation are obviously impossible so long as the interested parties refuse to meet each other. Moreover, since the truce is interpreted by them literally, as only a suspension of hostilities accompanied by no change in spirit, there is no abatement of hostile feelings which would permit some resumption of normal intercourse.

VIII. CONCLUSIONS

1. Since I presented my written suggestions to the Arab and Jewish authorities on 27 June, I have made no formal submission to either party of further suggestions or proposals for a definitive settlement. Since that date, however, I have held many oral discussions in the Arab capitals and Tel-Aviv, in the course of which various ideas on settlement have been freely exchanged. As regards my original suggestions, I hold to the opinion that they offered a general framework within which a reasonable and workable settlement might have been reached, had the two parties concerned been willing to discuss them. They were flatly rejected, however, by both parties. Since they were put forth on the explicit condition that they were purely tentative, were designed primarily to elicit views and counter-suggestions from each party, and, in any event, could be implemented only if agreed upon by both parties, I have never since pressed them. With respect to one basic concept in my suggestions, it has become increasingly clear to me that, however desirable a political and economic union might be in Palestine, the time is certainly not now propitious for the effectuation of any such scheme.

2. I do not consider it to be within my province to recommend to the Members of the United Nations a proposed course of action on the Palestine question. That is a responsibility of the Members acting through the appropriate organs. In my role as United Nations Mediator, however, it was inevitable that I should accumulate information and draw conclusions from my experience which might well be of assistance to Members of the United Nations in charting the future course of United Nations action on Palestine. I consider it my duty, therefore, to acquaint the Members of the United Nations, through the medium of this report, with certain of the conclusions on means of peaceful adjustment which have evolved from my frequent consultations with Arab and Jewish authorities over the past three and one-half months and from my personal appraisal of the present Palestinian scene. I do not suggest that these conclusions would provide the basis for a proposal which would readily win the willing approval of both parties. I have not, in the course of my intensive efforts to achieve agreement between Arabs and Jews, been able to devise any such formula. I am convinced, however, that it is possible at this stage to formulate a proposal which, if firmly approved and strongly backed by the General Assembly, would not be forcibly resisted by either side, confident as I am, of course, that the Security Council stands firm in its resolution of 15 July that military action shall not be employed by either party in the Palestine dispute. It cannot be ignored that the vast difference between now and last November is that a war has been started and stopped and that in the intervening months decisive events have occurred.

SEVEN BASIC PREMISES

3. The following seven basic premises form the basis for my conclusions:

Return to peace

(a) Peace must return to Palestine and every feasible measure should be taken to ensure that hostilities will not be resumed and that harmonious relations between Arab and Jew will ultimately be restored.

The Jewish State

(b) A Jewish State called Israel exists in Palestine and there are no sound reasons for assuming that it will not continue to do so.

Boundary determination

(c) The boundaries of this new State must finally be fixed either by formal agreement between the parties concerned or failing that, by the United Nations.

Continuous frontiers

(d) Adherence to the principle of geographical homogeneity and integration, which should be the major objective of the boundary arrangements, should apply equally to Arab and Jewish territories, whose frontiers should not therefore, be rigidly controlled by the territorial arrangements envisaged in the resolution of 29 November.

Right of repatriation

(e) The right of innocent people, uprooted from their homes by the present terror and ravages of war, to return to their homes, should be affirmed and made effective, with assurance of adequate compensation for the property of those who may choose not to return.

Jerusalem

(f) The City of Jerusalem, because of its religious and international significance and the complexity of interests involved, should be accorded special and separate treatment.

International responsibility

(g) International responsibility should be expressed where desirable and necessary in the form of international guarantees, as a means of allaying existing fears, and particularly with regard to boundaries and human rights.

SPECIFIC CONCLUSIONS

4. The following conclusions broadly outlined, would, in my view, considering all the circumstances, provide a reasonable, equitable and workable basis for settlement:

(a) Since the Security Council, under pain of Chapter VIII sanctions, has forbidden further employment of military action in Palestine as a means of settling the dispute should be pronounced formally ended either by mutual agreement of the parties or, failing that, by the United Nations. The existing indefinite truce should be superseded by a formal peace, or at the minimum, armistice which would involve either complete withdrawal and demobilization of armed forces or their wide separation by creation of broad demilitarized zones under United Nations supervision.

(b) The frontiers between the Arab and Jewish territories, in the absence of agreement between Arabs and Jews, should be established by the United Nations and delimited by a technical boundaries commission appointed by and responsible to the United Nations with the following revisions in the boundaries broadly defined in the resolution of the General Assembly of 29 November in order to make them more equitable, workable and consistent with existing realities in Palestine.

(I) The area known as the Negeb, south of a line running from the sea near Majdal east-southeast to Faluja (both of which places would be in Arab territory), should be defined as Arab territory;

(II) The frontier should run from Faluja north northeast to Ramleh and Lydda (both of which places would be in Arab territory, the frontier at Lydda then following the line established in the General Assembly resolution of 29 November;

(III) Galilee should be defined as Jewish territory.

(c) The disposition of the territory of Palestine not included within the boundaries of the Jewish State should be left to the Governments of the Arab States in full consultation with the Arab inhabitants of Palestine, with the recommendation, however, that in view of the historical connexion and common interests of Transjordan and Palestine there would be compelling reasons for merging the Arab territory of Palestine with the territory of Transjordan, subject to such frontier rectifications regarding other Arab States as may be found practicable and desirable.

(d) The United Nations, by declaration or other appropriate means, should undertake to provide special assurance that the boundaries between the Arab and Jewish territories shall be respected and maintained, subject only to such modifications as may be mutually agreed upon by parties concerned.

(e) The port of Haifa, including the oil refineries and terminals, and without prejudice to their inclusion in the sovereign territory of the Jewish State or the administration of the city of Haifa, should be declared a free port, with assurances of free access for interested Arab countries and an undertaking on their part to place no obstacle in the way of oil deliveries by pipeline to the Haifa refineries whose distribution would continue on the basis of the historical pattern.

(f) The airport of Lydda should be declared a free airport with assurance of access to it and employment of its facilities for Jerusalem and interested Arab countries.

(g) The City of Jerusalem, which should be understood as covering the area defined in the resolution of the General Assembly of 29 November, should be treated separately and should be placed under effective United Nations control with maximum feasible local autonomy for its Arab and Jewish communities with full safeguards for the protection of the Holy Places and sites and free access to them and for religious freedom.

(h) The right of unimpeded access to Jerusalem, by road, rail or air, should be fully respected by all parties.

(i) The right of the Arab refugees to return to their homes in Jewish-controlled territory at the earliest possible date should be affirmed by the United Nations, and their repatriation, resettlement and economic and social] rehabilitation, and payment of adequate compensation for the property of those choosing not to return, should be supervised and assisted by the United Nations conciliation commission described in paragraph (k) below.

(j) The political, economic, social and religious rights of all Arabs in the Jewish territory of Palestine and of all Jews in the Arab territory of Palestine should be fully guaranteed and respected by the authorities. The conciliation commission provided for in the following paragraph should supervise the observance of this guarantee. It should also lend its good offices, on the invitation of the parties, to any efforts toward exchanges of populations with a view to troublesome minority problems, and on the basis of adequate compensation for property owned.

(k) In view of the special nature of the Palestine problem and the dangerous complexities of Arab-Jewish relationships, the United Nations should establish a Palestine conciliation commission. This commission, which should be appointed for a limited period, should be responsible to the United Nations and act under its authority. The commission assisted by such United Nations personnel as may prove necessary, should undertake.

(I) To employ its good offices to make such recommendations to the parties or to the United Nations, and to take such other steps as may be appropriate, with a view to ensuring the continuation of the peaceful adjustment of the situation in Palestine;

(II) Such measures as it might consider appropriate in fostering the cultivation of friendly relations between Arabs and Jews;

(III) To supervise the observance of such boundary, road, railroad, free port, free airport, minority rights and other arrangements as may be decided upon by the United Nations;

(IV) To report promptly to the United Nations any development in Palestine likely to alter the arrangements approved by the United Nations in the Palestine settlement or to threaten the peace of the area.


ANNEX I

Correspondence exchanged between the parties and the United Nations Mediator, relating to the suggestions of 27 June 1948


I. LETTER DATED 3 JULY 1948, ADDRESSED TO THE UNITED NATIONS MEDIATOR
BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES


I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that the Political Committee of the League of Arab States, composed of their Foreign Ministers, has received your letter dated 27 June 1948, and carefully examined the suggestions you have put forth, in your capacity as United Nations Mediator, with a view to arriving at a peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine, and has asked me to bring the following to your notice, in reply to your letters of the same date addressed to the Foreign Ministers of the Arab States:

1. The Committee was glad to note what you recorded in the introductory statement accompanying your suggestions that the agreement to cease fire has brought a calmer atmosphere more favourable to the task of mediation entrusted to you by the General Assembly of the United Nations, and would like once more, before embarking on a careful analysis of the suggestions advanced and expressing its views thereon, to assure Your Excellency that it was only the Arab States' desire to cooperate with you in working out a peaceful solution of the Palestine problem and in creating the atmosphere best favourable for carrying out your task of mediation, and their equally keen desire to demonstrate their peaceful intentions to the world, that led them to agree to cease fire under the conditions Your Excellency proposed.

2. It had been agreed upon and decided that these conditions should be strictly observed in order to guard against the possible occurrence in the interval of any changes in the respective position of the parties concerned as they stood at the time of cease-fire on 11 June by which either party might benefit at the expense of the other.

The Arab States have loyally and most carefully respected these conditions, actuated in so doing by the desire to ensure the realization of the purpose at which they aimed. The other side, however, persisted in their disrespect and violation of these conditions, committing repeated breaches to which your attention has been duly drawn by the Arab States, and continued their provocative and aggressive activities in various parts of the country.

Undoubtedly your observers must have recorded all these activities by which the other side has greatly benefited so much so indeed that hundreds of immigrants of military age have entered the country, in addition to large quantities of arms, munitions and other war material. At the same time the other side has begun to fortify and consolidate its positions. It has actually occupied a number of strategic points and succeeded in provisioning some of its besieged forces. Furthermore, Zionist forces have prevented the Arab inhabitants of the areas they now occupy from gathering their harvest and used them for the erection of new fortifications.

All these activities are incompatible with the cease-fire conditions and detrimental to the position of the Arabs in the country, and the Committee avails itself of this opportunity once more to place on record these breaches and violations of the cease-fire conditions.

3. Your Excellency mentioned that the basic issues involved in the Palestine problem relate to partition, the establishment of a Jewish State and Jewish immigration, and stated that you had thoroughly studied, weighed and appraised the positions taken by the two parties. Your Excellency further interpreted your role of Mediator as one involving the offering of suggestions on the basis of which further discussions might take place, and that counter-suggestions might possibly be put forth in an endeavour to arrive at a peaceful settlement of the problem. You also declared that your analysis had taken into account the equities involved and the aspirations, fears and the motivations of the two parties, as well as the realities of the situation, and that you had come to the conclusion that it would be incompatible with the principles of equity and quite inconsistent with practical grounds to call upon either party to surrender completely its position, and that in the light of this analysis you saw a possibility of giving adequate assurances to both parties with regard to the vital factors in their respective positions. You concluded by stating that there was happily a common denominator which was acceptable to both sides - the recognition of the necessity for peaceful relations between Arabs and Jews in Palestine and of the principle of economic unity, and you stressed the point that it was with all these considerations in mind that you put forth your suggestions.

4. Your Excellency will recall what you have told the Political Committee at its meeting in Cairo on 15 June 1948, that you have accepted the task of Mediator unbound by any previous decisions. You will also recall the statement to the same effect you made before the special Sub-Committee at its; meeting on 16 June 1948, when you declared at the close of the afternoon sitting that the suggestions you proposed to put forth would in no way be based on the status quo in Palestine.

The suggestions advanced surprised the Political Committee because they are a reproduction of the basis of the partition plan which led to the present armed dispute, and aim at ensuring to one party all its ambitions while neglecting the aspirations and rights of the Arabs, who are the original owners of the country.

5. In compliance with Your Excellency's desire, the Political Committee has very carefully studied the suggestions, and was indeed surprised to find that the very first - that of considering the territories of the Hashemite Kingdom of Transjordan as part of Palestine stood on a false basis. In fact, involving that kingdom in the Palestine problem does not only exceed the terms of reference of mediation, but also constitutes a deliberate confirmation of the Zionists' false assertion that Palestine comprises the territories of that kingdom, an allegation which has never been conceded.

The Political Committee really cannot understand the motive of such an implication, nor the reasons that prompted you to consider it as a possible solution of the Palestine problem, the more so as the Hashemite Kingdom of Transjordan is an independent sovereign State, the independence of which is internationally recognized, and moreover it is an original member of the League of Arab States. Furthermore, that kingdom, long before the termination of the Mandate, was a State which led an autonomous existence, with a Head of State and Government of its own people. At that time, Palestine was directly governed by the Mandatory Power.

The Hashemite Kingdom of Transjordan opposes the partition of Palestine and the establishment of a Jewish State therein, and its armies, together with those of other Arab States, have entered Palestine in order to deliver the country from the Zionist aggression and restore security, peace and order to the Holy Land.

His Excellency the Transjordan Prime Minister, who attended the meetings of the Political Committee, proclaimed these realities in the following forceful and most eloquent declaration:

"I believe it is incumbent upon me to say a word about Count Bernadotte's suggestion, because it exceeds his terms of reference to involve the Hashemite Kingdom of Transjordan in the Palestine problem, on the ground that it lay within the boundaries of the Mandate as defined in 1922 - a false claim upheld by the Zionists, and loudly proclaimed by them on every occasion, despite the fact that our country has become an independent sovereign State, whose independence has been recognized by many a Power, and that it is an original member of the League of Arab States.

"The problem now at issue is the problem of Palestine and of finding a solution thereto. The Hashemite Kingdom of Transjordan should never be implicated in that problem, nor should Transjordan be forced into a union with a Jewish State.

"Our position is clear, and has been proclaimed on every occasion. It is never to allow the creation of a Jewish State in Palestine, and to exclude partition. And our object is to co-operate with other Arab States in her deliverance. Once this aim is attained, the determination of her future status is the right and concern of her own people. Theirs alone is the last word. We have no other object or aim in view. This is our attitude, which is an interpretation of the opinion of His Hashemite Majesty and that of his Government and people."

The Political Committee strongly upholds His Excellency in his declaration of these facts, on which all are agreed, and in placing these facts before Your Excellency, the Committee expresses the hope that no doubts will be entertained as to their accuracy.

6. The suggestions put forth by Your Excellency may be summed up as follows:

"(a) The formation of a union in Palestine comprising two members, one Arab and one Jewish, with the willingness of the directly interested parties. The boundaries of the two member States to be determined with the assistance of the Mediator. The purposes and functions of the union should be to promote common economic interests, such as customs, excise, etc., to undertake the development of projects, and to co-ordinate foreign policy and measures of common defence, which lay within the full control of each of the members of the union.

"(b) Immigration to the respective territories of the two members of the union during the first two years should be within the competence of each member. Thereafter, either member would be entitled to request the council of the union to review the immigration policy of the other member and to render a ruling thereon in the terms of the common interest of the union. In the event of the inability of the Council to reach a decision on the matter, the issue should be referred to the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, whose decision, in accordance with the principle of economic absorptive capacity, would be final.

"(c) Protection of religious and minority rights, preservation of the Holy Places and full guarantee of free access thereto, in accordance with the status quo.

"(d) Certain territorial arrangements, which might be worthy of consideration."

7. It is evident that these suggestions as a whole go to realize Zionist ambitions in respect of the partition of Palestine and the establishment of a Jewish State, in addition to the benefits they would derive from the economic unity by which you propose to bind both members.

As to immigration, which is the object of the fundamental dispute between the two parties, Your Excellency's suggestion does not only ensure the realization of all Zionist designs, but exceeds the provisions of the partition plan recommended by the General Assembly of the United Nations at its meeting of 29 November 1947. In fact, whereas the partition plan restricts immigration to a part of Palestine - the area to be allocated to the proposed Jewish State - the union proposal opens for it a far wider scope throughout the whole of Palestine and even the Hashemite Kingdom of Transjordan.

In this respect, the suggestion constitutes a discriminatory privilege to the Jews at the expense of the Arabs. Your Excellency further suggested that matters at issue between the two members of the union in connexion with the immigration policy be referred for final decision to the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, which should in rendering its decision take into account the principle of economic absorptive capacity.

Considering that immigration is the pivot on which the dispute between the two parties revolves, and is being utilized by the Zionists as an effective instrument for the realization of their political designs in Palestine and other Arab countries, in accordance with their plan known as "The Biltmore Programme", the conception of the suggestion is liable to lead to the continuation of this dispute.

There remains the suggestion for the economic unity of the two members of the union. This is sure evidence that the political partition of Palestine is an artificial move and that economic unity is intended to remedy its flaws and defects.

It is a known fact that the Zionists cannot lead an economic existence independent of the Arabs. Economic unity therefore is intended for safeguarding Zionist interests and the exploitation of the Arabs. This is not the case with the Arabs who, thanks to their co-operation with other neighbouring countries, are in a position to lead an economic existence. Your Excellency will recall that the partition plan recommended by the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, provided for the formation of economic unity between the Arab and Jewish States for the simple reason that the country cannot prosper economically without such unity. This clearly means that the country is indivisible economically. How could it then be divided politically?

As to the protection of minority rights and the preservation of the Holy Places, the Arabs have incessantly claimed it and worked for its realization. They have even expressed both to the Mandatory Power and the United Nations their willingness to accept all the guarantees necessary to ensure such protection.

Even the territorial arrangements annexed to the suggestions are based on partition and the establishment of a Jewish State, and are bound to lead to the same defects as the partition plan, which allocates to the Jews an area, half of the population of which are Arabs and possess the bulk of its land, while neglecting the rights of the Arabs and their natural aspirations.

Your Excellency will recall that the partition plan recommended by the General Assembly of the United Nations last year was categorically rejected by the Arabs and was the cause of the grave disturbances which led to so much bloodshed and destruction in Palestine as to have caused some of the supporters of the plan to abandon it.

The Security Council itself, after attempting during long months to find the means for its peaceful implementation, has failed and proposed the dissolution of the Partition Commission and the convocation of a special session of the General Assembly to reconsider the question.

8. The Political Committee took great care to give most careful consideration to the suggestions advanced in the hope of finding therein a remedy for the present state of things. It has compared them with the principles and ideals by which, as you mention you were guided in drawing them up. The Committee also compared them with the declarations you made in respect of your having assumed the role of Mediator unbound by any previous decisions, and that the suggestions were in no way based on the status quo in Palestine.

Unfortunately, the suggestions have proved to be most disappointing to the Arabs, because they aim at the realization of all Zionist ambitions and tend to grant to the Zionists more than was provided for by the partition plan, which was doomed to failure. Furthermore, the suggestions do not guarantee for the Arabs any of their demands, thus demonstrating that they did not weigh the causes of the present dispute and that no attempts were made at uprooting them. On the contrary, they made matters worse by the creation of additional causes of a nature to aggravate an already grave situation, and bring us no nearer to the peaceful solution which would put an end to aggression, safeguard legitimate rights, ensure the return of law and order and guarantee the restoration of security, peace and prosperity in this area.

For these reasons, the Political Committee deeply regrets to state that it cannot accept these suggestions as a suitable basis for discussion.

The Political Committee, considering the earnest desire of all the Arab States to co-operate closely with Your Excellency in your endeavours to arrive at a solution which would best guarantee the restoration of security and peace to Palestine, suggests the adoption of the attached proposal as a basis for discussion. In addition to its being based on the principles of justice and democracy, the proposal happily agrees, to a large extent, with many of the principles and ideals embodied in Your Excellency's introductory statement.

(Signed) Abdul Rahman AZZAM
Secretary-General of the League of Arab States


Draft of the Constitution and future Government of Palestine


1. A provisional government, representative of all important sections of the citizenry in proportion to their numerical strength, should be set up as early as possible in Palestine;

2. The provisional government should, as soon as practicable, enact an electoral law for the setting up of a constituent assembly, prepare an electoral register, and hold elections for the constituent assembly;

3. The constituent assembly should also function as a legislature, and the provisional government should be responsible to it until elections for a legislature are held under the new constitution;

4. While the task of framing a constitution for Palestine must be left to the constituent assembly, the following principles must be strictly adhered to:

(I) Palestine shall be a unitary and sovereign State;

(II) It shall have a democratic constitution with an elected legislature and an executive responsible to the legislature;

(III) The constitution shall provide guarantees for the sanctity of the Holy Places covering inviolability, maintenance, freedom of access and freedom of worship in accordance with the status quo;

(IV) The constitution shall guarantee respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion, and freedom of religious belief and practice in accordance with the status quo (including the maintenance of separate religious courts to deal with matters of personal status);

(V) The constitution shall guarantee the rights of religious bodies or other societies and individuals to maintain, in addition to educational establishments administered by public authority, educational institutions of their own, subject to normal government supervision and inspection;

(VI) The constitution shall recognize the right of Jews to employ Hebrew as a second official language in areas in which they are in a majority;

(VII) The law of naturalization and citizenship shall provide, among other conditions, that the applicant should be a legal resident of Palestine for a continuous period to be determined by the constituent assembly;

(VIII) The constitution shall ensure adequate representation in the executive and the administration of the distribution of representation in the legislature;

(IX) The constitution shall authorize the legislature to invest local authorities with wide discretion in matters connected with education, health and other social services;

(X) The constitution shall provide for the setting up of a supreme court, the jurisdiction of which shall include, inter alia, the power to pronounce upon the constitutional validity of all legislation, and it shall be open to any aggrieved party to have recourse to that tribunal;

(XI) The guarantees contained in the constitution concerning the rights and safeguards of the minorities shall not be subject to amendment or modification without the consent of the minority concerned expressed through a majority of its representatives in the legislature.

2. COMMENTS BY THE MEDIATOR ON THE ABOVE OBSERVATIONS OF THE LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES HANDED TO THE COMMITTEE IN CAIRO ON 3 JULY 1948.

I. General comments

1. As indicated clearly in paragraph 6 of the introductory statement to my suggestions, these are merely suggestions which I have put forth. They are tentative ideas only, and I have never expected that they would meet with unqualified approval by either party. The reactions of each party, however, can be very helpful in my continuing efforts at mediation.

2. What is my role as Mediator? Apart from the trust put in me by the United Nations, I come before you single-handed. I can personally make no decisions, impose no sanctions. Every idea set forth in my suggestions would require voluntary acceptance by both parties. I can force nothing on either party. As Mediator, I have but one purpose - to leave no stone unturned in my effort to bring about a peaceful adjustment of the situation in Palestine. I can make progress toward a just and reasonable settlement only as I could make progress in the truce negotiations by discovering some formulation on which there is a reasonable chance of gaining the agreement of both Arabs and Jews. Otherwise, it is inevitable that there will be a resumption of fighting unless some authority with greater power than I have can prevent it.

II. Specific comments

I have read with great care and interest the reply of the Political Committee of the League of Arab States to my suggestions. The reactions of the Arab States are set forth with clarity and precision. I have the following specific comments to make on this reply.

1. As regards the comments on the supervision of the observance of the truce, I may inform you that the various notes which I have received from you on this matter have been referred to Colonel Bonde, my Deputy in charge of the truce supervision. At an early date I will be in position to present a full report on these complaints. I may add that complaints of this nature have come from both sides, in approximately equal volume.

2. As regards paragraph 4 of your reply, I may say that it is my conviction that the suggestions which I have put before you are in no way based on the status quo in Palestine either de facto or de jure, for the following reasons:

(a) The de facto situation is that a Jewish Provisional Governmen