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UNITED
NATIONS
S

      Security Council
S/636/Rev.1
16 November 1953

Held on 16 November 1953, at 3 p.m.
Provisional agenda
(S/Agenda/638/Rev.1)

1. Adoption of the agenda.

2. The Palestine question
Compliance with and enforcement of the General Armistice Agreements, with special reference to recent acts of violence, and in particular to the incident at Qibya on 14-15 October 1953: report by the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization. The French interpretation of the statement made ,by Mr. Charles Malik (Lebanon) at the 637th meeting of the Council was read.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The Palestine question

Compliance with and enforcement of the General Armistice Agreements, with special reference to recent acts of violence, and in particular to the incident at Qibya on 14-15 October 1953 (S/3109, S/3110, S/3111) (continued)

REPORT BY THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION (continued)

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Eban, representative of Israel, Mr. Haikal, representative of the Hashemite Kingdom of the Jordan, and Major General Bennike, Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine, took places at the Council
table.

1. Mr HAIKAL (Hashemite Kingdom of the Jordan): First of all, I should like to express our thanks to the three guaranteeing Powers that have shown such deep concern and taken prompt action in bringing to the attention of the Security Council the mass destruction at Qibya, and the massacre of sixty-six of its inhabitants by organized military forces of Israel.

2. I also want to express our thanks to Major General Vagn Bennike, Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization, for his lucid and objective report [630th meeting] on the massacre of Qibya and other boundary incidents as well as for the great care he has taken to procure factual information in answering [635th meeting, annex] the numerous questions submitted to him by members of this council.

3. The gravity of the situation provoked by the Qibya massacre continues to constitute a threat to peace and security in all the area. Because of the indivisibility of peace, these tragic happenings have been widely and extensively reported in the world Press. The horror and inhumanity of this action in our times have deeply shocked world conscience, all the more so because Israel was created and survives by playing up its victimization by other people.

4. These expressions of shock and horror, both international bodies set up for the maintenance of world peace and the consensus of world opinion in condemning the Qibya massacres, are a hopeful sign that an awakening of international conscience against aggres-sion is in progress. The immediate effect of that world reaction has been to renew general confidence in international organizations for stopping aggressions, whenever it takes place, and by so doing, ensuring the maintenance of world peace.

5. Because, on the one hand, the report of Major -General Bennike concerning the Qibya massacre and, frontier violations contains much factual data care-fully and objectively presented, and because, on the other hand, other eminent speakers have elaborated on these, I do not think it is necessary for me to relate again in detail this great tragedy; I shall limit my observations to the three following points:

6. First, I shall make some brief remarks on the Qibya massacre and other acts of aggression and violations of the Armistice Agreements. Secondly, I shall try to explain the difference between individual Jordanian infiltration and the aggression carried out by Israeli organized military forces against Jordan. Thirdly, I shall mention the efforts of my Government and the extraordinary and emergency measures already taken by Jordan to prevent infiltration.

7. Before starting to examine these three points, I should like to be allowed to present briefly some remarks on the very long statement made by the Israeli representative at the 637th meeting.

8. Mr. Eban in his detailed address, tried to turn the focus of the Security Council discussions from the Qibya case to the general situation. in the Near East. It appears that Israel gives no, consideration to the fact-or tries to make us forget-that it is the Qibya tragedy that brought the guaranteeing Powers to consider that peace and security were threatened in the Near East by Israeli aggression. The United Nations has appreciated the concern of the guaranteeing Powers, and has considered the Qibya massacre serious enough to justify an emergency meeting of the Security Council and indict Israel for that warlike action on Jordan territory.

9. Instead of being humble and repentant for such a horrible crime, the Israeli representative would let us believe that the Israeli Government was "justified" or "provoked" in taking such brutal reprisals. He then went on to present his country as the real victim. Mr. Eban told us, in all candour, that Israel like no other country was the victim of an internationally indulged war and siege. Later, with much pathos, he attempted to prove Israeli generosity and benevolence. In a special paragraph concerning unilateral gestures, lie seems to have completely forgotten that one million Palestinian Arabs have been rendered refugees by Israelis and that for the last five years these Arabs have led a wretched existence in camps, while Israelis have been enjoying Arab properties in Israel valued at $12,000 million. Talk of generous unilateral gestures on the part of Israel's can only bring a bitter smile to those acquainted with the reality of the situation and the treatment of Arabs by Israelis.

10. With a heart full of love rising to spiritual levels, Mr. Eban described his country as small, weak, crushed, and Israelis as a peace-loving people, in order to inspire the Council's pity and to enroll its help in reaching for peace. Of course, Mr. Eban means a peace on Israeli terms.

11. We have the right to ask the question: Do Israelis really want peace? If they really wanted peace they would long since have attained it by implementing the United Nations decisions. When the United Nations passed a resolution creating Israel, it was not a unila-teral undertaking. The United Nations undertook as well, at the same time, the safeguarding of a minimum of the natural and inalienable rights of the Arabs who had been living for untold centuries in Palestine.

12. Israelis have not even conformed with the United Nations resolution: giving them a part of Palestine; it is a too well-known fact that they have overrun by force the better half of the part of Palestine that the United Nations Partition Plan I had left to the Arabs, the owners of the country.

13. Israelis have constantly challenged the Arabs, the United Nations and the world by their refusal to return the part of Palestinian territory that they unlaw-fully occupy. In the same way, they have constantly refused to obey the United Nations resolutions sanc-tioning the right of the refugees to return to their homes and the refugees' natural rights of private ownership, rights which the United Nations has repeatedly sanctioned for the last five years,

14. If Israel wants peace, it is a certain kind of peace. We should not be deceived. At present, the Israelis are not begging for a peace based on the principles of the Charter, or on United Nations decisions, or on the natural rights of people. An Israeli peace would recognize no rights whatever for the million Arabs they have displaced. It is evident enough that if the Arabs could be "forced" to such' a peace, it would bring numerous economic, political and mili-tary advantages to Israel and it would not be long before the Israelis would claim that the Arabs had
willingly, once and for all, renounced all their natural rights in Palestine.

15. All the evidence available points to the fact that Israeli aggressions against Jordan are carried out systematically and, follow well-prepared plans. They are not just spontaneous expressions or, like the Qibya tragedy described, in Mr. Eban's words, "an unfor-tunate explosion of pent-up feelings".

16. To anyone interested in the maintenance of security in the area, it is a disquieting fact that Israeli aggressions are mainly directed against Jordan. These aggressions, as confirmed by General Bennike, are becoming more frequent all the time. Most of them are carried out by Israeli armed forces or Israeli military forces; to be exact, in 1953, out of twenty-one Israeli aggressions condemned by the Mixed Armistice Commission, sixteen were carried out by military forces. Also disquieting is the fact that trained armed Israelis participate in increasing numbers in these warlike actions, and that these actions penetrate more and more deeply into Jordanian territory.

17. Jordan and not only Jordan but all observers of Israeli policy and Israeli political methods have been led to conclude that the Israelis carry on their hostile actions with the hope of weakening Jordanian morale, preparing the ground for future Israeli aggrandizement and imposing peace on Israeli terms.

18. As regards peace and security, the Israelis are dangerously miscalculating the result of their policy of intimidation on the Arabs.

19. Let us not be deceived by Israeli declarations of love and longing for peace. We have to face realistically the numerous facts which, indicate that Israel is bent on a policy of aggrandizement. If not recognized and checked, this expansionist policy of Israel, sooner or later, is going to develop into a full-fledged armed conflict in the Near East. Nobody can predict what kind of political repercussions such a war could have in the area.

20. A new Israeli war of aggrandizement is not pure presumption. Many Israeli leaders are openly advocating such a policy.

21. The chief of staff of the Israeli army, General Makleff, was quoted in a pamphlet published by a Zionist youth organization of the United States as having declared, in referring to Israel's boundaries:

"It is a bad, irrationally drawn frontier, never meant to last". This Zionist youth organization further wrote:

"A partitioned, divided Eretz-lsrael, deprived of the Jordan River, the fertile plains of Transjordan, the historic Jerusalem, is a mockery and a violation of the most sacred ideals and principles of the Jewish people ... There can be no peace until Israel's boundaries are defensible, until the River Jordan is in our hands ... This is our immediate task: the reunity of Jerusalem old and new, the elimination ... of the Has4ernite Kingdom of the Jordan and the reestablishment of Jewish rule over all of Eretz-Israel on both sides of the Jordan."

22. I find it is my duty to alert this Council to the definitely aggressive bent of Israeli foreign policy, and I request that all necessary measures be taken by this international body to check Israel's aggrandizement policy without delay. Not only for the safety of Jordan, but for the welfare of the international community, it is of the utmost importance to realize the gravity of the situation. Effective measures should
be considered without delay, such as the limitation of of Israeli immigration in the area, and the control of Israeli armaments, so that the armaments are limited to the requirements for defense and are not of a size to promote Israel's aggressive plans of expansion.

23. I had not intended to enter into a discussion of these points, but I have done so because of the focus of Mr. Eban's speech. Concerning Mr. Eban's secondary charges against Jordan charges brought up in order to turn the Council's attention from the Qibya massacre in which the Israelis cannot escape their official responsibility I do not propose to refute these charges one by one, but I issue here a general denial of these charges in order to limit myself to the case under discussion.

24. The tragedy of Qibya is known well enough so that I will just refer here to factual evidence reported by the United Nations neutral observers after inves-tigations made on the spot.

25. During the night of 14-15 October 1953, a force of about 300 well trained Israeli -soldiers, accompanied by a demolition engineering squadron, crossed into Jordan territory and carried out a well-planned attack against the village of Qibya. The assailants were uniformly described by witnesses as Israelis in military uniform with full equipment.

26. These Israeli soldiers carried out their offensive action with the use of standard Israeli army equip-ment, such as Bangalore torpedoes to blast pathways through barbed wire; they used at least seventy demolition bombs, a number of incendiary bombs, and two-inch mortars against the village of Qibya. Numerous previous complaints have proved that this equipment was used only by military forces. Let us refer to what General Bennike says in his report [630th meeting, para. 26], when he quotes commander Hutchison's report:

"The evidence noted indicated that this raid was well planned and carried out by men expertly trained in the fundamentals of sudden and sustained attack. It seems highly improbable that other than active military forces could have carried out this raid without suffering heavy casualties from their own fire, or from the explosions of their demolition charges."

27. To cover the withdrawal of these Israeli armed forces other Israeli support troops -began shelling the neighboring villages of Budrus and Shuqba, damaging a number of houses.

28. The Israelis immediately claimed that they had victoriously carried out a mission of retaliation against Qibya. All occupants of dwellings had been murdered at, close range. In all, there were sixty-six innocent victims, most of them women and children; forty houses, the village 'school, the mosque, the water reservoir, had been razed to the ground and one more, Jordanian village rendered uninhabitable.

29. The horror of the Israeli troop action at Qibya could be reported with many more elaborate details taken from evidence verified by neutral observers of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization. But perhaps more important is the fact that this accumulated evidence has paralyzed the desperate efforts of Israeli leaders to escape their official respon-sibility and throw the blame on some irresponsible Israeli villagers.

30. Let us not pass over unnoticed the fact that these tactics are becoming traditional for some Israeli political leaders. Nobody has yet completely forgotten the innumerable crimes committed by Zionists during the British Mandate in Palestine against Arabs, British soldiers and government officials. The horror that seized the world at the dynamiting of the King David Hotel in Jerusalem then the location of the central government of Palestine, in which 140 innocent men and women government employees found a tragic death is far from forgotten, and was echoed in the blasts and murders of Deir Yassin in 1948 and Qibya in 1953.

31. The Jewish Agency, with the same leaders who now lead the Israeli Government, expressed their horror and disavowed this terrorist crime at the King David Hotel, which they blamed on some irresponsible individuals as is now being done in the case of the Qibya massacres. Yet, some time later the British Government was able to publish documents establishing that this horrifying crime had been initiated by the Jewish Agency and its leaders themselves.

32. The Qibya massacre has -been described and condemned by most leading newspapers and reviews, by ranking political leaders, and by religious beads all over the world. In order not to lengthen this exposition by too many quotations, I will limit myself to two. Ti4im magazine of 26 October 1953 describes the incident in these terms:

"At 9.30 one night, most of the people were just going to bed in the Jordanian village of Qibya . . . a mile and a half beyond the Israeli frontier ... On this quiet night, as usual, everyone put his trust in the U.N. 'truce' and 30 skimpily armed Jordanian national guardsmen. Suddenly, Israeli artillery, previously zeroed onto target, opened tip, and a 600-man battallion of uniformed Israeli regulars swept across the border to encircle the village. For the next 2 and half hours the town shuddered under shell bursts and smallarms fire; villagers, screaming and milling, rushed out to the surrounding fields and olive groves.

"Then the guardsmen's ammo (25 rounds per man) gave out, and the Israelis moved into Qibya with rifle and Sten guns. They shot every man, woman and child they could find, then turned-their fire on the cattle. After that they dynamited 42 houses, a school and a mosque. The cries of the dying could be heard amid the explosions. The villagers huddled in the grass could see Israeli soldiers slouching in the doorways of their homes, smoking and joking, their young faces illuminated by the flames. By 3 a.m., the Israelis' work was done ... Sixty-six died that night ... It was the bloodiest night of border warfare since the 1949 armistice ... In the slaughter of Qibya, Israel made peace harder than ever to attain."

33. The New York Times of 6 November 1953 reported that "The Archbishop of York ... spokesman for the Church of England.. . condemned Israel for the cruel massacre of Arab men, women and children in the Jordanian ... village of Qibya ... He said
there was 'little doubt' that the raid on Qibya had been carried out by the regular forces of Israel and was not a raid by 'a few irresponsible terrorists'. 'For many months past,' Dr. Garbett continued, there have been acts of violence ... but this in its calculated horror is different in degree. It is well that the State of Israel should realize the disquiet and indignation caused on both sides of the Atlantic by this brutal act ... He added that unless 'some strong line' were adopted the Middle East would find itself 'ablaze"'.

34. Indeed the massacres of Qibya, organized and carried out by Israeli official forces, are not an isolated incident. This is the culminating point of the practice constantly used by the Israelis of achieving their ambitions by ruthless methods and later rejecting all responsibility for the consequences, while continuing to play the part of the victim. It would be impossible to relate here all the attacks by Israeli armed forces on Jordan since 1948 since they are much too numerous. I shall content myself with mentioning some of the most recent Israeli aggressions which have taken place in 1953.

35. Jordan had adhered willingly to two agreements worked out under the auspices of the Truce Supervision Organization, "to curb infiltration" and "to reduce border incidents".

36. On 4 January 1953 three Israeli -soldiers and one civilian crossed the armistice line in the area of Latrun, which is of special, military importance and great strategic value. These four Israelis were caught by a Jordanian patrol. They were not molested, and they were later released into Israeli custody. Jordan lodged a complaint with the Armistice Commission, which condemned Israel. In answering the Israeli representative's second question, General Vagn Bermike stated [635th meeting, annex section VI, question 2]:

"This case resulted in the cancellation by Israel on 8 January of the agreement to reduce and solve incidents. The previous agreement on measures to curb infiltration, which thereupon automatically went into effect, was also terminated by Israel. The can-cellation of both these agreements added to the rapidly developing tension."

37. On 23 January 1953 an armed Israeli force of approximately fifty men crossed the frontier into Jordan territory and attacked Falameh village, which is about 1,200 yards inside Jordan territory. These Israeli armed forces cut the barbed wire protecting the village and, once inside the perimeter, were challenged by the small national guard contingent. Israelis immediately fired with automatic weapons from three directions inside the perimeter. They also threw band grenades and fired pistols. A confused battle raged for two hours, when the village national guard, which had been reinforced by other national guard contingents from the two neighboring villages, Jaiyus and Kafr Jima, forced the Israelis to withdraw. At daybreak the body of an Israeli soldier was found inside the wire perimeter of Falameh village.

38. As usual, Israeli authorities have tried to deny the participation of their military forces in this attack. Mr. Eban's last question was obviously formulated in the hope of eliciting an answer from the Chief of Staff which would cast some doubt on the existing evidence. To that end the Israeli representative asked (635th meeting, annex, section VI, question, 16] General Bennike to "tell us whether the body" found at Falameh on 23 January "had any identi-fication disc which would have identified him as an Israeli soldier; whether the number on the disc was communicated to the Israeli authorities, and whether the body was handed over to Israel". The factual answer of the Chief of Staff was: "The body had an Israeli identification disc marked with the number 232046 and the name Yehuda Kacim, in Hebrew. This information was communicated to the Israeli author-ities. On 23 January, the body was handed over to two officers of the Israeli Army who accepted it as that of an Israeli soldier without any reservations on this point."

39. Six nights later, on 29 January, another Israeli attack was launched on the same village. This time is was on a larger scale: an Israeli battalion was used and two companies were deployed. The village was softened up by fire from heavy mortars, while Israeli platoons took positions on points overlooking the town to ensure that reinforcements could not reach Falameh. Fire lasted three hours, and at the end Israelis were engaged hand to hand. When they/with-drew there were ten wounded Arabs, seven of them women and children. The village Mukhtar was found dead, shot at a range of about fifteen yards. Three houses were completely demolished.

40. On 28 January, just a few hours before this last attack on Falameh, another Israeli attack had occurred at Rantis. Two sections of Israelis, about fifteen soldiers, entered the village under covering fire from a third section, which had taken position at a point in the southwest outskirts of the village. After an hour's firing this raiding party was repulsed. Two Arab national guards were killed and two others wounded. The Israelis left behind a quantity of explosives, appa-rently intended for demolitions in the village.

41. We note in paragraph 33 of Major General Vagn Bennike's report that on 24 January 1953 Israeli representatives complained to the Chief of Staff that three Jordan villages, Falameh, Rantis and Qalqiliya, were used as bases of operations for marauders infiltrating into Israel. On the night of 28-29 January 1953, as we have just revealed, the villages of Falameh and Rantis were attacked and raided by Israeli military forces. Paragraph 3 of Commander Hutchison's report indicates that "81-mm. mortars, P.I.A.T. and Banga-lore torpedoes were among the weapons used. Israel condemned for this action and it was brought out ... that Israel military forces had carried out this raid"

42. On 3 February Israelis opened fire on Qalqiliya, using rifles and 3-inch mortars with which they shelled the Jordan police post. The Mixed Armistice Commission condemned the Israeli regular forces under article III, paragraph 3 of the General Armistice Agreement.

43. On 21 February an Israeli infantry platoon advanced from Beit Nattif and opened fire on Khirbet El Dier wounding one Jordan civilian, and the Mixed Armistice Commission condemned Israeli military forces.

44. On 20 April an Israeli platoon from Beit Jibrin opened fire on Khirbet Rasm Nofal in the Arab area. Jordan casualties were one national guard killed and another wounded. One Arab Legion soldier was also wounded and one woman killed. Again Israeli military forces were condemned for this violation of the Armistice Agreement.

45. On 28 May six armored Israeli cars with Israeli soldiers crossed into Jordan and opened fire on farmers. The Mixed Armistice Commission condemned Israeli military forces under article III, paragraphs 2 and 3, and article II, paragraph 1, annex II part I, paragraph 2 of the Armistice Agreement.

46. On 12 June, at Khirbet Beit Emin, four Israeli soldiers crossed into Jordan and killed one village guard and wounded another. The Mixed Armistice Commission condemned Israeli regular army forces under article III, paragraph 2.

47. On 20 July a platoon from the Israeli Army crossed into Jordan and blew up a house at Nahhalin killing two Arab civilians. The Mixed Armistice Commission condemned Israeli regular forces under article III, paragraph 2 of the Armistice Agreement.

48. On 2 August three sections of the Israeli Army took positions and opened fire on Qatanna. On the Jordan side one' woman was killed and three men who injured. The Mixed Armistice Commission con-demned Israeli armed forces under article III, para-graph 2 of the Armistice Agreement.

49. On the night of 11-12 August the villages of Wadi Fukin, Idna, and Surif in Jordan territory were attacked by Israeli troops. In paragraph 3 of Com-mander Hutchison's report we read that the Mixed Armistice Commission condemned Israeli regular forces for having carried out these raids. The report continues: "Substantiating the contention that regular military forces took part in these raids is the fact that the body of an Israel soldier in full uniform with identification tag was found in the village of Idna after the attack."

50. I am not going to read a complete list of all Israeli aggressions against Jordan because it would take too much of the Council's time. I shall limit my-self to giving some global figures which will show the importance of these violations of the Armistice Agree-ment by Israel. From November 1950 to November 1953 the Mixed Armistice Commission has condemned Israeli armed forces forty-four times; I have reported above but a few. With every condemnation, the Mixed Armistice Commission has asked Israel to take all necessary measures to prevent the repetition of such violation of the Armistice Agreement. However, these aggressions did not stop, but rather increased in scope and number. Our official records indicate that from February 1952 to October 1953 Israelis have provoked 464 incidents.

51. Most Israeli attacks are skillfully planned and carried out by regular Israeli military forces. In his answer to my third question [635th meeting, annex, section VII] General Bennike stated that in 1953 alone, out of twenty-one resolutions condemning Israel, sixteen were condemnations of attacks against Jordan carried out by Israeli military forces. Jordan has suffered much loss of life and material damage because of Israeli aggressive actions. The number of Jordanians killed and injured by Israeli armed forces reaches the impressive figure of 629.

52. Obviously, Israeli armed forces have not been deterred from their terrorist activities by the repeated condemnations of the Mixed Armistice Commission. With increasing strength and boldness, they are killing and plundering in Jordan territory, their actions culminating in the Qibya massacre. But in spite of the gravity of the Qibya tragedy, and in spite of the moral condemnation of this action by world opinion, it appears that the Israelis have not renounced their policy of systematic aggression.

53. I shall not mention all the incidents which have followed the Qibya case but I shall make a special reference to the destruction of the Jerusalem water pipeline.

54. On the evening of 1 November the water pipeline from Ein Fara, which is the main water supply for the Jordan half of Jerusalem, was shattered by a time bomb at a point one mile north of Mount Scopus demilitarized zone. Police investigation revealed that a time fuse had been used and that the tracks led to the edge of the Hadassah sector of the demilitarized zone, which is occupied by Israeli police.

55. General Bennike, in answer to the second question of the representative of Lebanon said: [635th meeting, annex, section V] A United Nations observer, three Jorda-nian officers and an experienced tracker followed tracks from the scene of the incident to within seven meters of the fence around the Jewish sector of Mount Scopus. Here the investigating party was stopped by an Israeli police inspector. Even though the United Nations observer was satisfied that the tracks he saw at the point near the Scopus fence were the same as those seen at the site of the explosion, the Israeli inspector refused to let the tracker of the United Nations observer come nearer the fence. The United Nations observer, who is my representative for Mount Scopus, was at that time with the Israeli inspector inside the Mount Scopus area and was not allowed to continue the investi-gation inside the area."

56. This was evidence enough that the destruction of a part of the water pipe-line serving the Arab part of Jerusalem was carried out by Israelis who entered from the demilitarized zone. This is one more action which is characteristic of the Israeli attitude towards respect for international agreements.

57. The calculated horror of the Qibya massacre, carried out by military forces of a Member State of the United Nations pretending to be anxious for peace, is proof that such a Government cannot be trusted. Such a crime should not go unpunished in the interest of all concerned, and its repetition should be made impossible.

58. The infiltration problem has already been exploited to the full by Israeli propaganda. The intent of this propaganda has been to magnify to the outside world the plague of Arab infiltration and to represent the Israelis as victimized, in order to gain further sym-pathy. Meanwhile, on the spot, the infiltration problem is used to justify retaliatory military operations on civilian populations. This has been going on for a long time, according to the reports of United Nations observers.

59. We should like first to explain the reason for infiltration to the Israeli side of the demarcation line. Infiltration from the Jordan side is engaged in by individuals usually with no intention of hurting the Israelis but rather, in desperation, in order to see again their relatives, their friends, or their properties. It is a hard fact that one million Arabs have been compelled by force to leave their places in Palestine now occupied by Israel. These individuals find them-selves reduced to living a destitute life, without hope, in degrading material conditions, while reflecting on the enormous amount of Arab property in Israeli hands, property valued at no less than 12,000 million. A number of these individuals with relatives or former interests in Israel cannot always resist the temptation of crossing to the other side. This often results in individual arrests or incidents involving penalties of years of imprisonment, not excluding the ever present risk of being shot by Israeli bullets.

60. Some of these so-called infiltrators who have no intention of hurting Israelis are children who try to sell, across the demarcation line, eggs or vegetables, of which there is a great shortage in Israel. A sad story about these children is that many of them have been shot and killed by Israeli patrols.

61. We should also point to the fact that the armis-tice lines have been so inexpertly drawn as to divide houses from gardens, villages from their fields and farms, and at times, from their only well. There are even instances in which the line runs through backyards of dwellings. Such situations are found to exist in Qatanna village, in Qalqiliya and other places along the armistice demarcation lines.

62. It is difficult to make people understand that crossing into their backyards, picking fruits in their gardens, drawing water out of their wells, longing to see once more an old relative, visiting the grave of a dear one constitute a violation of an international agreement and entail each time one more condemnation against Jordan, or provoke a border incident, or worse, can be invoked by Israelis as reason for military reprisals on other innocent villagers.

63. Again, it is necessary to emphasize that most Jordanian infiltration is carried out on an individual basis, by unarmed individuals. A good number of this type of infiltrators do not easily understand why they should be so sternly dealt with by authorities on either side for entering their homes, their fields, their gardens, or trying to dig out some of their buried wealth. We do not attempt here to justify this type of infiltration, because, as a Government, we have subscribed to international agreements which make it our duty to co-operate in preventing infiltration. What we are trying to point out is that, at the individual level, the problem does exist for many plain humani-tarian reasons. These reasons will continue to exist as long as people live, suffer and remember.

64. These minor individual offences constitute the bulk of the infiltration problem from the Jordan side and consequently such offences make up the bulk of Jordanian violations of the Armistice Agreement.

65. Now there exists also a secondary and limited type of infiltration engaged in by armed individuals, and it could well be that the present economic plight of the country affects somewhat this situation. Some armed individuals cross the demarcation line for illicit operations such as smuggling or robbery, and when' they clash with guardsmen or troops, investigations of United Nations observers lead to condemnation of Jordan for illegal infiltration. As is to be expected, such instances are exploited to the full by Israeli propaganda and serve as pretext of bloody reprisals on innocent people.

66. Thirdly, let us mention that, while infiltration at the beginning was largely unarmed and occurred for personal and individual motives, the bitterness of Jordan border populations has steadily increased with the repeated savage attacks of Israeli soldiers. This can only increase the number of ruined, bereaved persons who are likely to infiltrate into Israel, to revenge themselves on the murderers of their families.

67. What can be the feelings of that guardsman at a who was on: duty that night to prevent infiltration and who returned in the morning to find his home destroyed, and the eleven members of his family all dead from Israeli gunfire? On the same order, let us recall the instances in which incendiary bombs were used by Israeli military forces to burn fields of grain inside Jordan. Paragraph 6 of Hutchison's report indicates that on 28 May 1953, the following resolution was passed:

"The Mixed Armistice Commission decides that the burning of crops by Israel soldiers in Jordan territory is a breach of the General Armistice Agree-ment, article III, paragraph 3."

68. What can be the feelings of these poor Jordanian farmers when they see the fruits of months of hard labor destroyed by Israeli fire, leaving them no choice but to lament and starve? Human endurance has limits; anger and famine are bad advisers. Is it
to be wondered at that some of these people, defying existing regulations, try to reach Israeli crops across the demarcation lines?

69. Let us now turn to what happens from the Israeli side.

70. Israelis pretend to be blind to the root of the problem and the causes of infiltration. They just want to wipe out the resulting situation by methods of force, disregarding humanitarian considerations and international practices.

71. The Israeli conviction is that this state of affairs justifies wiping out operations by their regular armed forces against Jordanian villages. We have already pointed out the part of the Chief of Staff's report dealing with these repeated aggressive actions of Israeli soldiers.

72. We leave to this honorable body of world opinion to decide whether such bloody reprisals by the Israeli army against civilians on our soil are humanly justifiable. Do not such acts constitute something more than violations of the Armistice Agreement? Do not they in fact constitute acts of war?

73. It is evident that there is a considerable diffe-rence, as regards the threat to peace and security, between the gravity of Jordanian infiltration carried out by individuals and aggressive action taken by Israeli armed forces. The obvious difference is that the Israeli way to deal with the problem leads straight to a shooting war, while Jordan infiltration can be controlled by peaceful means.

74. Israel has complained at different times that crimes committed in Israel have been the work ofinfiltrators. It is a fact that many crimes in Israel which had been first imputed by the Israeli Press to infiltrators have been found later to have been the work of organized Israeli bands formed as a result Of certain political, economic and social struggles inside Israel.

75. Anyhow, infiltration can on no account justify aggression by Israeli armed forces against Jordanians on Jordan territory. The Israeli Government must be brought to recognize the principle that action to stop the infiltration of which they complain must be confined entirely to the territory occupied by Israel, in accordance with general practices and international procedure.

76. In international practice, every country is solely responsible for its own frontier. If Mexicans enter the United States illegally, the United States Government does not complain to the Mexican Government for letting them leave Mexico; neither will the United States take military reprisals against innocent villagers across the Mexican side of the border.

77. Best results in curbing infiltration can be obtained through sincere Israeli collaboration with the United Nations bodies and organizations set up for the super-vision of the Armistice Agreements. No improvement of the situation can be hoped for, until Israelis give some concrete proof of their faith that peaceful means are more likely to ease the problem of infiltration than resort to brutal force.

78. All allegations that high authorities in Jordan are encouraging infiltration are pure propaganda. Israelis have occasionally stated that infiltration is officially encouraged by Jordan but they have never pressed it or produced any evidence. No only is there no evidence to give ground to such allegations but the allegations are contrary to the, facts.

79. Our Government is seriously concerned by the problem of infiltration and is anxious to do all in its power to keep it in check. To that end, it has taken numerous elaborate measures. These measures can be classified finder three headings: legislation, the setting tip of guards and police forces, and the working out of special agreements under the auspices of the Mixed Armistice Commission.

80. In normal times, democratic countries have no laws which require that their citizens obtain a special permit to leave the country. It is usual practice that citizens leave their country at will, and are not sought for punishment when they do so.

81. Jordan is one of the numerous countries which has no legal provision to that effect. However, and in spite of current international practice, Jordan,, in an effort to tackle the infiltration problem has used an emergency ordinance against Jordanians who cross armistice demarcation lines. On the basis of that ordinance local governors condemn those Jordanians to terms of imprisonment of various lengths. Some infiltrators have received terms of three years of imprisonment with forced labor.

82. Actually, half of the persons in Jordan prisons have been confined for the offence of infiltration. On account, the Government has been the target of much criticism in the Parliament and Press of Jordan. However, the Jordan Government has been firm and consistent in its attitude towards the problem, in the hope that if both sides co-operate fully with the Truce Supervision Organization and honor the obligations they have undertaken, infiltration can be brought to a minimum.

83, Besides these legal and administrative measures, Jordan has set up a special police force to guard armistice demarcation lines and prevent crossing from either side. This effort has been costly and this special police force represents an extra and heavy burden on the small and poor country such as Jordan. The Chief of Staff in his report [S/3047] gives recognition to the fact that "Jordan is taking measures against infiltration and will continue to do so".

41 the third place, Jordan has subscribed to special agreements under the auspices of the Mixed Armistice Commission in order to curb infiltration by all available means. In May 1952, the agreements on measures to curb infiltration came into force. On
29 December of the same year, it was replaced by an agreement to reduce border incidents. It was hoped that this new agreement would help to settle current problems in a more co-operative spirit and consequently it was considered an improvement on the previous one. However, ten days later, Israelis announced that the new agreement to reduce and solve incidents was null and void. The agreement provided that should it come to expiration, the old agreement on measures to curb infiltration would automatically enter again into force. But the Israelis, in voiding the new agreement, also gave formal notice of their desire to terminate the old agreement in two weeks time.

85. The denunciation of these two agreements was promptly followed by Israel attacks on the villages of Falameh, Rantis and Qalqiiya.

86. Anyone reading paragraphs 31, 32 and 33 of the Chief of Staff's report can easily follow this deterioration of the situation.

87. Israelis did not content themselves with formally denouncing agreements aimed at curbing infiltration and 'with sending their troops to carry on these attacks on Jordan territory, but the officer in charge of the Israel delegation to the Mixed Armistice Commission stated during one of the last April meetings in which the Rantis incident was discussed "that he saw no useful purpose in the working of the Mixed Armistice Com-mission".

88. The measures taken by the Jordan Government have resulted in a great decrease in the scope of infiltration. This decrease is indicated by the diminution in the number of Israel complaints regarding infiltration submitted to the Armistice Commission. During the first nine months of 1952, Israel submitted 233 complaints, During the same period in 1953, it submitted 172 complaints, as mentioned in the answers of Major General Vagn Bermike [635th meeting, section VI, question 8].

89. The situation deteriorated later because of the Israelis' denunciation of the two agreements to curb infiltration and reduce border incidents. At the begin-ning of June, relentless efforts of the commission succeeded in setting up a new local commander's agree-ment to which Jordan readily adhered. The resumption of local commanders' meetings improved the situation to some extent. At the end of August, this agreement was renewed for a further period of three months. But the improvement was short lived and increased tensions developed, bringing the situation to a rupture point after repeated aggressions by Israel armed forces, culminating in the Qibya tragedy.

90. When, on 13 October, a hand grenade, thrown it a house of Yahud. a village situated ten kilometers inside the Israel side of the armistice line, Israelis immediately claimed that a Jordanian infiltrator was responsible for the crime. Jordan immediately offered co-operation in finding the guilty persons, if the claim were true. For the first time Israel accepted such facilities, always offered by Jordan in such cases. A trail followed by an Israel police dog led across the demarcation line, but there was lost. To quote Major General Vagn Bermike's answer to the second question of the representative of the United Kingdom (635th meeting, annex, section. I] : "Immediately following the receipt of the Israeli complaint, United Nations observers ... carried out an investigation. There was no evidence on the ground to indicate who had committed the crime".

91. Whoever was the author of the crime-an infil-trator or a member of an Israeli band-it was a horrible crime, as declared by the Jordan delegate at the Mixed Armistice Commission meeting on 14 October. The Jordan Government spared no effort in helping to find and punish the criminals. This is evidenced by the fact that the Chief of Staff of the Arab Legion himself immediately took the case into consideration. Early on the morning of 14 October, he flew from Amman to Jerusalem and requested a meeting with the Acting Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission. At the same time, the Jordan delegate asked the senior Israeli delegate, when the commission met on 14 October to ask the Israelis "not to retaliate [because] ... if any retaliation action is taken, then the whole issue will be difficult and it will confuse the investigation on our side".

92. Twenty-four hours later, Israeli military forces indulged in the Qibya massacre. The incident at Yahud could not in any way justify the murder by their forces of sixty-six innocent victims in a Jordanian village and the shelling of two other villages.

93. It is not without interest to compare the attitude of the Jordan authorities in the Yahud case with the attitude of the Israeli authorities in the case of the destruction of the Jerusalem water pipeline. In the first instance, Jordan offered all facilities to both the United Nations observers and the Israelis to carry on the investigation in Jordan territory. In the case of the destruction of the Jerusalem pipeline, the Israelis offered no facilities at all to the United Nations inves-tigators. It was not only a lack of co-operation, but a simple refusal to let the investigation proceed when Israeli authorities barred all United Nations inves-tigators from carrying on their work in the demili-tarized zone of Mount Scopus.

94. While the Jordan Government, in the face of intolerable provocation, has kept its faith in the United Nations, official Israeli spokesmen, having made up their minds that international bodies such as the Mixed Armistice Commission serve no useful purpose, seem to have adopted the philosophy, dangerous for the international community, that "might is right".

95. Israelis have emphasized that they have proposed talks between high-ranking military commanders, talks which did not take place. It is interesting to know what has happened in this respect.

96. First of all, I should like to point out that Israel and Jordan have two different conceptions of the way respect for boundaries and demarcation lines should be ensured. The Jordan Government is a civilian government and all its administrative departments are run by civilian personnel. Contraventions, crimes committed along boundaries, demarcation lines or elsewhere in Jordan are dealt with by the police and justice departments. The Israeli Government's conception is that any offence committed along boundaries and demarcation lines comes within the competence of the military authorities.

97. In consequence, Jordan is represented in the Mixed Armistice Commission by a civilian, while the Israeli representative is a military officer. According to the conception of the Jordan Government, all matters arising from cases of infiltration in Jordan are a police problem.

98. Israel's proposal to have talks between high-ranking military officers was met by Jordan on the basis of its conception that the control of demarcation lines should be entrusted to civilian officers. In consequence, the Jordan representative in the meeting which followed was the Jordan senior delegate at the Mixed Armistice Commission. The Israelis, on the other hand, were represented by a military officer.

99. It is not international practice for one State to press another State to appoint a high-ranking military officer when the State concerned desires to be represented by a civilian at a given meeting. Such pressure is nothing less than an interference in the administration of the other State.

100. Another related difficulty is the Israeli demand that the Arab Legion be stationed on the demarcation line to control infiltration. It has always been Jordan's contention that problems of infiltration are a police matter. Besides, Jordan is convinced that to maintain military forces on the demarcation lines is to increase the probability of serious trouble. Witness the continual inroads on Jordan by Israeli armed forces. We are convinced that if Israeli armed forces were not stationed along the demarcation lines, the security situation in the area would be much improved.

101. Concerning the latest Israeli proposal that senior political and military representatives of Israel and Jordan should meet at United Nations Headquarters without delay to discuss armistice problems, I should like to remark that my delegation is here to express the views of the Jordan Government on the Qibya massacre, and we have no credentials to enter into any other discussions.

102. If the Israeli Government has some proposal to submit to the Jordan Government, the proper channel would be through the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization. If there is agreement, the most suitable place for such discussions would likely be Jerusalem, because of its proximity and facility of communications with the two Govern-ments.

103. The Qibya case is a flagrant aggression and a treacherous act of war. It has resulted in a dangerous state of political tension in the area. Had not the Jordan Government been able to exercise patience and restraint and had it met violence with violence, as was demanded by public outcry, the Palestine war would have flared up again.

104. Now, both official circles and masses throughout the Arab world await anxiously the decisions that the Security Council will take in the matter. Either the aggressor will be sternly condemned and practical guarantees will be recommended to prevent any recur-rence of such breaches of the Armistice Agreement, or the condemnation will be in such vague and general terms that it will leave no choice for countries that find themselves the victims of aggression but to rely on their own power to repel the aggressor. We all know that at no time and nowhere have such methods been. favorable to stability.

105. The debates have amply demonstrated that the Israelis have no respect for the numerous condemna-tions of the Mixed Armistice Commission requiring them to take adequate measures to prevent the recur-rence of the aggressions of their armed forces. Such a state of affairs has led to our conviction that blame and condemnation alone will not put an end to Israeli aggressions. For this reason, my delegation requests the following:

106. First, that Israel be condemned for the Qibya massacre in the strongest of terms-terms which should match the atrocity and horror of the action of Israeli armed forces.

107. Secondly, that Israel be asked to proceed with the trial and punishment of all Israeli officials-military officers or civilians-responsible for that horrible crime. This is the only direct way in which Israel can prove its sincerity in disapproving the Qibya massacre.

108. Thirdly, that Israel be asked to prevent the repetition of any kind of aggression by its military forces or other armed forces against Jordan.

109. Fourthly, that no military aid or financial assistance be granted to Israel without specific guarantees that such help will not contribute to further Israeli aggressions. It should also be disposed that in case of new Israeli aggressions, such aid would be discontinued. Only then would the Israelis realize the full meaning of the great countries' guarantee of boundaries and truce demarcation lines. Nothing less is likely to affect the aggressive attitude of Israel.


110. Fifthly, that all other possible measures to check Israeli aggressive and expansionist policy be taken without delay.

111. The situation in the Near East today is as grave as it was in 1948. It has been proved in this Council that well-trained Israeli armed forces indulge in serious acts of aggression deep into Jordan territory, up to 18 miles in the south and about 3 miles in the thickly populated areas, and that the serious nature of these aggressions is a threat to collective security in that part of the world. Only by putting an end to Israeli warlike actions will security be restored and tranquillity prevail in that area.

112. I request permission to circulate to the members of the Council an album. containing a few pictures taken shortly after the Qibya massacre and I would ask the Secretariat of the Security Council to file this album with the documents relating to this incidents.

113. Mr. EBAN (Israel): I may seek occasion at a later meeting to deal in more detail with the very long, immoderate and inflammatory speech to which we have just listened, but I should like now merely to make some urgent observations on the major aspects of the situation which confronts the Security Council at the end of that speech.

114. Before I do that, however, I should like to clarify one or two matters in which the views which I have submitted on behalf of my Government have been misrepresented. The representative of Jordan found it possible to ascribe to me the statement that the Qibya incidents were justified. I shall not repeat exactly what I did say to the Security Council about that tragic and unhappy occurrence, but what I said was
precisely the opposite, in every true sense, of that which the representative of Jordan has ascribed to me. That mis-representation is of special importance because, in the course of a very long and thorough review of the situation from his point of view, the representative of Jordan has, to our regret, refused to attach any importance whatever to expressing a single word of regret or repentance or concern with respect to the hundreds of my countrymen, killed by his, or the thousands of our citizens slaughtered before in that war of expansion in which the Kingdom of Transjordan expanded to its present limits.

115. No human being, I think, is capable of any greater act of irreverence than to confine his sympathy for human life to his own political framework, and here, I repeat with some indignation, is the representative of a neighboring country whose actions have left thousands of our people slaughtered on the field of battle and hundreds done to death since the Armistice Agreement was signed, and he cannot spare a single word of regret or humility or concern to match those which I did utter and would, on any occasion, repeat with reference to the loss of innocent life on the other side of the frontier.

116. I say this not because I believe that the Security Council itself Will follow him into such a unilateral or tendentious discrimination in its expressions of sympathy, but because it does illustrate, I think, a certain lack of candour and of humbleness in the approach to the humanitarian aspects of this border tension.

117. My main object is to refer to a proposal of which I seized the Security Council towards the end of its last meeting and which was aimed at contributing towards a solution of this problem, of which the tragic character has been vividly revealed in all the speeches to which we have listened. The proposal was, and is, for a discussion at United Nations Headquarters of the entire problem of border tension within the framework of the discussion of that problem now being undertaken by the Security Council.

118. 1 must express grave disappointment with what appeared to be the completely negative response of the representative of Jordan to that proposal, and I still feel that it deserves far more mature and deliberate consideration precisely in the light of the observations which the representative of Jordan made on the subs-tance of the matter; for what is the position which now faces us as a result of the policy of no peace with Israel proclaimed by the Government of Jordan? The border tensions on our frontier with Jordan have reached a very high and acute point. The thousands of illegal crossings of the armistice frontier from Jordan into Israel in violation of article, IV, paragraph 3 of the Armistice Agreement have caused, us hundreds of dead and further hundreds of casualties, and have also led to reactions sonic of which have the deeply deplorable consequences to which I referred at our last meeting. These hundreds of dead as a result of the thousands of illegal crossings augment, in the public opinion of our country, the thousands of casualties of Arab aggression inflicted upon us in the invasion of Israel, in which the armed forces of Jordan played a central and a major role. This violent movement of incursion, as I pointed out last time, is concentrated against a very short, specific and well-recognized area, namely, the area of the State of Israel immediately facing the coastal plain.

119. It is our submission that there is a possibility, if there is a desire to do so, of bringing about a complete cessation of these murderous incursions and, therefore, of their unhappy results. But the element of urgency is inseparable from the procedural proposal 'which I made for an immediate meeting at United Nations Headquarters on a high level of governmental responsibility, to take under immediate review all aspects of the border tension and of its causes with a view. to the elimination of all these clashes and all these results. 120. If we could ever have been in doubt as to the urgency of this problem and the need to bring it under immediate general review, the events of the last three weeks would, I think, have convinced us of the growing gravity of the situation, because since 16 October the scene on our border with Jordan, mostly in the area which I described before, on the strength of General Bennike's report, as being the main area of armed raids, has had the following aspects:

16 October. A group of armed raiders from Jordan attack a police patrol near Petah Tigva. They are pursued to the Jordan border.

19 October. Armed raiders from Jordan attempt to penetrate the village of Ramat Hakovesh. The attack is foiled. One infiltrator is killed when a hand grenade explodes in his pocket.


20 October. Regular Jordan troops of the Arab Legion fire at a train near Bir Karshieh, south of Jerusalem.

21 October. Armed Jordanians trespass on Israel territory and open fire on a patrol near Bir Karshieh.

22 October. Saboteurs from Jordan derail a locomotive and thirteen cars of the main Haifa-Tel Aviv train near Ayal. The mining was intended to explode a fuel train which ordinarily passes at that hour. The Mixed Armistice Commission condemns the Govern-ment of Jordan for this violation.

24 October. An Israeli police post in the Kakun area is fired upon from across the Jordan border. The same day Arab Legion -soldiers threaten to open fire on an Israel commander walking near the armistice line in the Ayal area where the train had been derailed.

29 October. An Israeli officer on his way to an Israeli-Jordan local commanders' meeting near Budrus is fired upon by Arab, Legion soldiers from across the border.

30 October. Armed Jordanians penetrate Neve Ilan, a village in the Jerusalem area. They open fire on the watchman and steal tools and other items from the villagers.

4 November. Jordanian national guardsman cross the armistice line into Israel near Attir in the northern Negeb. They seize three Israel shepherds and their flock of more than 350 head of cattle.

5 November. Armed Jordanians attack the railway station guard north of Hadera. They kill the railway signalman and take away the guard's weapons. An Israel patrol encounters armed infiltrators from Jordan who penetrate Israel in the neighborhood of Beit Guvrin.

6 November. An Israeli soldier is kidnapped and killed by Egyptian soldiers. Another Israel soldier is wounded but escapes. The body of the Israel soldier returned by the Egyptians is riddled with bullets fired from one meter range, and has cuts in the back and the stomach. The incident occurs when a three-man border patrol stops to exchange cigarettes and conversation with an Egyptian patrol.

11 November. Arab 14on troops attack a group of Israeli Arabs, women and children and a Jewish watchman 150 meters inside Israel territory near Sharafat. Eighteen women and children and the watchman are kidnapped and forced into Jordan territory. One woman is wounded and the watchman is later murdered.

121. Does this not build up a strong case for the assumption that the problems that we are dealing with here are of the highest degree of contemporary urgency and that they cannot be dealt with by refusing summary methods of high-level consultation in deference to the normal routine? Local processes of consultation, valuable as they are, have conspicuously failed, even according to the Jordan representative's own statistics, to have any limiting effect upon the armed raids, and therefore upon the results of those raids. It is to meet this problem of growing gravity and urgency that our proposal was conceived, a proposal for an urgent conference to seek means both of stopping these incursions, and therefore of preventing all reactions to them, both legitimate reactions and reactions which are regarded as imprudent.

122. It is in the light of such a list of events within a period of two to three weeks that it seems to us to fall short of any level of international responsibility to ignore an opportunity for consulting, within, the shelter of United Nations Headquarters, upon means for putting an end to this process, and thereby of preventing all those movements which create such an insecurity of life apparently on, both sides of the frontier.

123. The second element in our proposal, in addition to that of urgency, is the use of United Nations Head-quarters for the purpose of such a meeting. We believe that this fully conforms with the purposes of our Organization as a center in which efforts at inter-national conciliation should be harmonized, and it also has the advantage of taking place at a scene in which all expert opinion with experience in this problem is easily available for consultation. This proposal is quite different, it belongs to an utterly different world from the proposal made by the representative of Jordan for a return to those routine discussions at Mixed Armistice Commission levels which have operated over a period of years and which have left the situation in its present state of acute mutual suspicion and of grievous frontier conflict.

124. The urgency of such a consultation becomes all the more apparent if we analyze the main conclu-sions in the constructive sense of the speech to which we have just listened. For I think that we may search its lines in vain for any indication of a tendency towards a solution, or even an alleviation of this crisis.

125. Shall there be a stop to this movement of murderous incursions? The answer is given in the most negative terms. We are told that at the individual level the problem of infiltration does exist for many plain humanitarian reasons. These reasons, said the representative of Jordan, will continue to exist as long as people live, suffer and remember. These minor individual offences and that is his description of the movement of murderous raids upon Israel constitute the bulk of the infiltration problem from the Jordan side, and consequently such offences make up the bulk of Jordanian violations of the Armistice Agreement. If words have any meaning these words only convey a clear prediction that in so far as the responsibility of the Jordan Government is concerned, the position on Israel's frontier shall continue to be as tense and as insecure as it has been in the past. We cannot take
any comfort at all from the description of this move-ment in such words as "minor individual offences". The attack on Beit Nabala: was that a minor individual offence? The slaying of men, women and children, by the hundreds over a period of months: can all that be legitimately described as a minor individual offence? The attack on passenger buses and on crowded passenger railways: can all this be described as a minor individual offence? I doubt very much whether this verbal description, which tends to depreciate in the minds of the Jordan public the entire significance and gravity of this murderous movement, is likely to communicate itself to our side of the frontier. There-fore, even in this realm of description, in the moral definition of these events, we cannot see in the Jordan speech anything except a factor in itself for the aggravation of the problem under discussion. And certainly, no citizen of Jordan who lived by the word of a speech such as this would look with any concern or with any apprehension upon that movement which has caused us these hundreds of casualties and which has accordingly made our frontier "a line of fire and
blood", to quote and Arab pronouncement in the Security Council itself.

126. Shall the frontier line be given greater identity; shall it be demarcated with greater energy or specific-ness? The answer is, No. Will the Jordan Govern-ment act through its armed forces to, prevent thousands of illegal crossings of this frontier? The answer is, No. The Jordan representative tells us quite candidly that the armed forces of Jordan will continue to dissociate themselves from any such responsibility and will leave the armistice frontier between Jordan and Israel in the custody of the local interests in whose care the frontier has been left up till now. The obvious result will be that this pattern - thousands of crossings with hundreds of murders and defensive measures will continue to exist.

127. When to all this is added, as I have said, the refusal to express any regret for our loss of innocent life we, build up, a picture of a very sterile deadlock which cannot move out of its present rancorous furrow unless some diplomatic initiative is taken beyond the level of normal routine.

128. The refusal to embark upon a short-term settlement is, I think, especially, disquieting when it is linked to a general refusal to embark upon a long-term settlement either. Thus Jordan will not talk to us on any level of responsibility about a border settlement. Nor will Jordan talk to us about a total settlement of out-standing, questions such as would eliminate all the circumstances out of which both armed marauding and border rioting flow. Thus, what we have so far reached is a continuation of the present tension with no attempt whatever to eliminate its causes, and I must suggest to the Security Council in all earnestness that we, on our part, do not believe that this is an adequate international response to the tense situation which has brought the Council into session.

129. It has, I think, become quite obvious that the public exchange of positions is unlikely to lead to anything, except, perhaps, an increasingly clear and vivid illustration of how tense the situation is. It, is for this reason that we have sought, and still seek, to supple-ment local recourse to the Mixed Armistice Com-missions by this proposal for a general review of the entire state of the Israel-Jordan Armistice Agreement at the United Nations Headquarters. That Agreement is of special importance and, I think, requires especially earnest scrutiny because of the great width and depth of its imperfections. The preamble of the Agreement, relating to a transition to peace, is repudiated. Article I, with its similar message, is ignored. Article IV establishing a frontier line across which civilians may not move without authorization, is set aside and there is nothing in the speech to which we have just listened which indicates that it will be brought under respon-sible military control. Article VIII, which affects the position on Mount Scopus, is in a complete paralysis owing to Jordan's refusal to implement it so far. In other words, the basic structure the entire found-ation-of this Agreement is in such a state of acute disrepair as to require and demand of both parties an earnest attempt to rebuild that structure if, through a failure to achieve a peace settlement, we are destined to live within that armistice frontier for a further period of time. But the negative attitude which says that we will neither move on -towards peace nor make at) attempt fundamentally to repair the existing armis-tice structure tinder which we live-this seems to me a most sterile approach which does not augur well for any improvement in the tense security situation on the frontier concerned.

130. It is in that spirit that we have followed with care the proposals which the Jordan representative made for improving the situation which has cost both our countries so heavily in terms of suffering, bereave-ment and anguish. In so far as I can interpret his words, his suggestion is simply that the situation, in every single material respect, shall continue to be exactly as it is now, that the United Nations should ignore the movement of murderous incursions which have caused this tension but that is should heavily criticize the measures which Israel has taken to defend itself against them. We have the declared and avowed proposal that the Jordan military command, notwithstanding the Armistice Agreement, shall refuse to accept responsibility for safeguarding that frontier from within. And we just have a new proposal that this abdication from responsibility which prevails on that side of the frontier should be instituted on our side of the frontier, and that Israel regular armed forces should also dissociate themselves from any effort to maintain or guard the frontier. If that were to happen then instead of some four hundred casualties we should probably have some four thousand within the same period of time.

131. It seems to me that the Security Council has, therefore, really reached the decisive moment in its treatment of this question. It has heard an exchange of views representing the concern which the two governments feel for their security and for the stability of their life in the frontier area. On our part it has heard a proposal consistent with the normal practice of the Security Council in almost every other dispute - a proposal for dealing with the specific conflict in order to create conditions which would be tolerable until such time as the more normal intercourse and relationships of peace shall come to prevail between us. I would, therefore, again ask the Security Council to continue to give its support to this problem of finding a way out of this deadlock, this impasse, which we have reached, and not to follow the Jordan representative in, a mere orgy of unilateral criticism bereft of any proposal, either political or procedural, which would enable the Security Council to find a means of bringing security to the tormented region.

132. Mr. Charles MALIK (Lebanon): If I may say so with respect, I think that the tone of the repre-sentative of Israel this afternoon shows an improvment over his tone the other day. In return, I would assure him, that for every improvement he shows in his tone he will find a decided improvement in the tone of those who oppose him.

133. I do not know how long the representative of Israel was intending to speak. I always like to listen to him at length, because the more he talks the more substance he gives me to reflect upon and the more material to comment upon and refute, and this is always welcome. I tried to listen to him very carefully this afternoon, but, so far as I heard him, the adjectives he used in reference to the Qibya affair -"the Qibya massacre", to use a term which was used by one member of the Council -were "tragic" and "unhappy", and on one occasion he used the word "imprudent". Of course, he had not a prepared statement before him, and in those circumstances a person must be allowed a certain latitude such as -that which I am sure will be allowed to me now when I am speaking not from a text but merely from notes. But I think that the situation requires more that a statement of how "tragic" and "unhappy" it was, and something more than this word "imprudent" which Mr. Eban used.

134. It is not true that, as the representative of Israel said, the attitude of the representative of Jordan was wholly negative. In the first place, the representative of Jordan said that if Israel had any suggestions to make it could make them to the general armistice supervision machinery in Palestine, and that this machinery could take it up at the appropriate place and in the appropriate manner. That, therefore, is something constructive and positive which the repre-sentative of Jordan has given us this afternoon.

135. Furthermore, be suggested a series of lines along which the Council could move in its deliberations and in the formulation of its resolution. That is also constructive and positive.

136. I do not think that any objective comparison between the language used by the representative of Jordan this afternoon and that used by the representatives of Israel in his statement on 12 November [637th meeting] will reveal that Mr. Eban was the angel and the representative of Jordan was something of a different description; but I would say to the representative of Israel that his tone was considerably improved, which is quite a gain on the whole. He told us of a number of things that had happened in November and before. But we also heard figures given by the representative of Jordan. Why should the Council believe claims made by one State rather than claims made by another State? Was it not precisely for that reason that the United Nations established its own truce supervision machinery so as to enable the Council to make an objective estimate of all these figures with which the two representatives at this table have flooded us within the last week? I submit that we have only one available objective criterion whereby we may tell what has really happened in Palestine and how much the two countries have suffered in, the way of casualties, and that criterion is provided in the report of the Mixed Armistice Commission.

137. Why did Mr. Eban not have the courage to refer to that report and to read some of the questions and answers? I think it would be a good thing to do that. And why did he not refer to the figures in General Bennike's answers to the questions put to him by the Security Council [635th meeting, annex, appendix 1]. These figures give a totally different story from the one given by the representative of Israel this afternoon. I am asking only that the Council should not accept the words of Israel or of Jordan. Nevertheless, if it accepts the words of one, it should accept
the words of the other. But we have the truce supervision machinery to assess the truth behind these figures.

138. What do we find in General Bennike's answers? I shall give the Council a summary of my calculations on he figures on that page. I am sure that the members of the Israel delegation assisting Mr. Eban have pointed these out to him. My calculations can be verified. I do not know whether representatives have any private sources of information but, I repeat, the truce supervisory machinery is the only objective criterion on which we can base our conclusions. The Armistice Commission has verified these figures-and I shall later on talk about the relative degrees of reliability of the claims made by both Israel and Jordan and I have made an interesting calculation. Let us say that Israel makes 500 complaints; possibly the Mixed Armistice Commission verifies only all proportion of that figure. But whatever the relative degrees of reliability of the claims of Israel 'Jordan, the figures show that since 1949, from very beginning of this Whole affair, Israel, in Israel territory, has lost 24 people killed; and Jordan, in its own territory, has lost 77 people killed, of whom 55 lost their lives at Qibya. Of the 77 killed since June 1949 in Jordan by Israel, 55 were killed four weeks in the Qibya incident. This is a very interesting calculation which can be verified in General Bennike's answers.


139. Compare these verified figures with those which I have heard from both sides. These are the only figures which we have to rely on and they tell a different story, namely, that Jordan has lost, up to the middle of October, 77 people, and Israel 24. If Mr. Eban would like to know where I got the figure 24 I can tell him. Perhaps he is making his own calcu-lations. Perhaps he cannot find the figure 24 on page 45; I arrived at it by adding the 14 Israelis killed from June 1949 through 1952 and the 10 killed from 1 January through 15 October 1953. To arrive at the figure of 77 it is necessary to add the figures 55 and 22 in the corresponding columns.

140. There are many other conclusions of a purely mathematical nature which can be drawn from these figures.

141. I should like to take a few moments of the Council's time to read some extracts from the Jewish Press in various parts of the world showing that Jews have been morally shocked by the events at Qibya. That is a good sign. There is no doubt that the Jewish people throughout the world who have been steeped in the highest ethical teachings have been deeply shocked by the Israeli action at Qibya. I should like to read a few reports to prove to the Council that the conscience of the world, including the conscience of the Jewish people, is becoming increasingly aware of the horror of the incidents which took place, four weeks ago in Jordan.

142. First I shall read from the The Jewish Chronicle of London of 23 October. Everybody knows that that paper was very pro-Israel all along and that it is quite conservative. I now read you its comments on the happenings at Qibya:

"What standards are we to adopt in passing judg-ment? Surely, we have no option but to base our-selves on those ethical precepts on which our religion is founded, but the jettisoning of which will lead to the annihilation of our raison d'etre as a com-munity. By that standard is there any possible moral justification for this cruel - assault on the Jordan villagers? This was not self-defense against armed attack. This is not my language, Mr. Eban, it is the language of the The Jewish Chronicle of London "It was reprisal of the same kind that was perpetrated by our enemies in the last war. If the action was morally unjustified, can it, perhaps, be excused on grounds of expediency? Surely not." The paper goes on to say "For what could be more stupid than to alienate the sympathy of so many of Israel's friends at a time when, more than ever, their support is vital to its well-being if not to its existence? The deferment of American financial aid may be attributable to the River Jordan dispute, but that by itself is indicative of present Sate Department thinking and cannot but serve as a serious warning" I am not speaking for the American Government on this. I am only reading from what I see in the The Jewish Chronicle of London, which then concludes as follows-"The evil which was wrought by the fanatics who perpetrated the crime of Deir Yassin this is not my language. This is the language of the The Jewish Chronicle "has never been entirely eliminated. Unless the Israeli Government will dissociate itself from this action and punish the culprits it may well have an even more disastrous effect than the irresponsible action of the Irgun terrorists."

143. Now what about the American Press? It also reacted very justly to this whole affair. I do not have with me all details of the study I have made on this matter, but I must salute the American Press in this connection for the just manner in which it first reacted to the massacre at Qibya. This is a good sign also, because certainly if there is going to be justice and peace in the Near East, certainly the great. American Press, with its enormous influence, must sooner or later wake up to the fact that it must treat the matter impartially and justly and not always take the position that Israel wants it to take. I will quote from only one of the papers here. This is what the National Jewish Post of Indianapolis, in its editorial of 30 October, while deploring the use that the pro-Arab propagandists will make of the episode, said: “... Still, this does not relieve the United States Jewish community from voicing it utmost condemnation of what took place . . . Be-Gurion’s explanation is not acceptable . . . we cannot believe that any Israeli settlements, no matter how exposed to the Arab marauders" and Mr. Eban gave a lurid account of the terrible exposure to which the Israeli settlements are subject along the frontiers "would e taken into their own hands to inflict such horrible retaliation." It then goes on to say, and this is very significant I am not saying these words; it is the National Jewish Post "Qibya was in effect another Lidice and no United States person who was living at the time of this detestable nazi wipingout of an entire village will forget the world's horror at that act.”

144. I shall read on another occasion something that was published by the New York Post, which also uses the word Lidice in describing what happened at Qibya. Now I say that these are hopeful signs, the more so as they come from either Jewish papers or pro-Israel papers. I shall read more of these reactions of the Press to this matter in order, first, to prove to the Council, that there has been moral indignation at what has happened, and also, to show that the Arab world noticed that the rest of the world is not altogether indifferent to these horrible events to encourage the Arab world to realize that they are not altogether forgotten by the rest of the world, and to underline what I have already said that it is most encouraging to find this spontaneous reaction of the world Press to these terrible events.

145. I do not know what your plans are with regard to the further consideration of this item and when you plan to continue considering it, but it is very clear that whatever the proposals of the representative of Israel, they cannot be considered formally by the Council, unless one of the members presents them. Therefore, the representative of Israel must induce the representative of the United States, the representative of Chile, the representative of China, the representative of Colombia,
representative of Denmark, the representative of France, the representative of Greece, myself, the representative of Pakistan, the representative of the Soviet Union or the representative of the United Kingdom, to present their formal proposals. He has every right to present proposals to the Council, but he has no right to ask us to act on them, unless one of us should adopt them as his own and present them formally I do not know whether any other member Security Council is going to do that. For my part, I am not yet sufficiently moved, either by Mr. Eban’s eloquence or by his persuasiveness, to feel that I am in a position to present them. But, sooner or later, the Council should be seized of formal proposals. Of course, I am deferring my own text until I see whether anybody else is going to submit one. I have a text right here in my-pocket which I should like to present formally to the Council for its consideration, but I will not do so until I see what others have in mind.

146. I am not going to press anybody to present his text quickly, but it seems to me, as I said, that what Mr. Eban has told us is such that it cannot be acted upon except if one of us should adopt it and present it to the Council.

147. I reserve the right to comment at length on Mr. Eban's extensive speech [637th meeting] and I shall do so at an appropriate time later in the debate. I shall also present to the Council what I have often promised it I would do: a mathematical analysis precisely in the style of Spinoza, based not on the the accounts of Mr. Eban or of Mr. Haikal much as I respect both of them but on the accounts of the only objective United Nations agency that has dealt with this matter and from which we. have received documents of the highest importance. I hope that my mathematical analysis will throw some light on what action the Council should take.

148. I reserve the right to do these two things: to comment at length on Mr. Eban's statement of 12 November 1953; and to inform the Council, far more formally and substantively than has been done so far, of the substance, the cream, the significance, the real contents of the two reports which General Bennike has submitted to us.

149. The PRESIDENT (translated from French): Since there are no more speakers on my list, I shall adjourn the meeting. Unless any member of the Council objects, the next meeting on the question dealt with today will be held on Friday next, 20 November, at 3 P.M.

It was so decided.
The meeting rose at 6.10 p.m.




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